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HUDA SALMAN ALMEER 
 
EVALUATING CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES OF THE GCC 
ISLAMIC BANKS THROUGH DISCLOSURE 
ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been one of the most 
contested issues during the last few decades, due to the consequences it has for 
business and society.  The concept of CSR represents corporate activities, beyond 
profit making, which include protecting the environment, caring for employees, being 
ethical in trading, and getting involved in the local community. Despite the fact that 
the primary goal of enterprises is to generate profit, they can be voluntarily involved 
in solving social and environmental problems. Furthermore, endorsing human rights, 
community contribution, human resource management, socially responsible investing, 
and social reporting, in particular, are some of the main issues of CSR. 
While CSR is expected to be practiced for being socially acceptable, another 
important and related aspect of corporations including banks are corporate 
governance (CG). In particular, with the recent financial crises, the importance of CG 
has emerged as an important factor.  
Considering that Islamic finance aims to develop an alternative paradigm, it has 
consequences for CSR and CG. As argued in this research, Islamic moral economy 
base suggests an integrated CSR and CG. 
This research hence aims to explore and examine the CSR and CG performance of the 
GCC Islamic banks through information communicated by their annual reports in 
relation to a disclosure index created by the help of Islamic moral economy and 
various standardization documents. For this, fifteen Islamic banks was sampled from 
five GCC Islamic banks; and through content analysis the disclosed information in 
line with the created index analyzed for the period of 2008-2012. 
The findings of this research indicate that the CSR and CG performance of the 
sampled Islamic banks are very low; and is not compatible with the expectations 
developed through Islamic moral economy. The study also found that there is a 
positive but statistically insignificant relationship between CSR and CG practices in 
the case of sampled banks for the period in question. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
 
“Be a community that calls for what is good, urges what is right and forbids what is 
wrong”  
(Qur’an, Surah Al-i-Imaran-3: 104) 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, Islamic banking has experienced unprecedented 
growth, with an increasing number of Islamic banks and financial institutions present 
in most economies across the world. The basis of Islamic finance is rooted in Islamic 
ethics derived from the Islamic law and the principles of the Shari’ah. The 
ontological sources of Islamic ethics and law consist of the Holy Quran and the 
Sunnah or the practices of the Prophet, which are then clarified by ijma (scholarly 
consensus) and qiyas (analogy) (El-Gamal, 2006: 27).  
The initial Islamic banking experience was based mainly around social banking, as in 
the case of Mith Ghamr in Egypt in 1963. It was not until 1975 that the first 
commercial Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, was established in Dubai. This paved 
the way for the development of Islamic banking outside the GCC region; and, as The 
Banker (2013) noted, there are now more than 500 Islamic banks in various forms 
operating in different parts of the world with managed assets of over USD 2 trillion. 
As Islamic banks have shown tremendous growth, the debate over their Islamic 
ethicality has become heated; while some arguing that their corporate and shareholder 
nature, others insist on their ethical foundations and stakeholder nature.  
Regardless of this debate, Islamic banks are seen as a modern form of financial 
institution, which aim to maximize their profit subject to social and ethical 
considerations. Therefore, Gray and Blamer (2001: 1) labelled such corporations as 
“having corporate identity” or being socially responsible. The ethical and social 
identity of Islamic banks is related to their Shari’ah compliancy in terms of 
complying with the prohibition of riba or charging of interest and uncertainty as well 
as through profit-loss-sharing and risk sharing, and through asset-based/asset-backed 
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financing. Furthermore, the ethical or moral nature of Islamic finance directly relates 
to Islam’s way of understanding human beings, corporations and their respective 
places in the world and everyday life. 
While Islamic moral economy treats ‘social responsibility’ as essential for all 
Muslims, the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been one of the 
most discussed issues during the past few decades in relation to the practices of the 
corporate sector. Since the 1950s, the growing number of social and economic 
problems has significantly affected not only the terminology of the debate about the 
social responsibility of business, including adopting the concept of CSR, but also has 
developed the subject as a discipline (Carriga and Melé, 2004: 51). In responding to 
CSR initiatives intellectually and practically, Friedman (1996: 6) shows strong 
opposition by suggesting that the main and only responsibility of business is to utilize 
its resources and put them into practice in order to increase profits. Despite such 
counter positions, the field of CSR has developed as an academic field of study as 
well as a practice; and presently comprises a large number of theories, approaches and 
definitions. Thus, CRS has become a subject of debate concerning to what extent 
organizations should be socially responsible and thus have a positive contribution on 
society beyond their own organizational aims (Lantos, 2001: 1).  
The concept of CSR is concerned with corporate activities beyond profit-making, 
including protecting the environment, caring for employees, being ethical in trading 
and becoming involved in the local community. In sum, it suggests returning at least 
certain rights to the society within which the company operates. Thus, despite the fact 
that the primary goal of enterprises is to generate profit, they can be voluntarily (and 
sometimes mandatorily) involved in mitigating social and environmental problems 
within the framework of being socially responsible. Within this context, endorsing 
human rights, contributing to the community, managing human resource, investing in 
a socially responsible manner and social reporting are some of the main issues of CSR 
(CSR Europe, 2001: 1). 
Along with CSR, corporate governance (CG) is also an essential structural component 
of modern institutions, be it financial or otherwise. CG refers to the way in which a 
firm or an institution is structured and managed, and how the relationships between 
different levels within an organization and with other external stakeholders are 
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arranged. Since CG emerged as an essential best practice area within the larger 
governance issues during the 1980s, various sets of definitions have been applied to 
the concept based on the perspectives of the person who utilizes the concept and how 
they apply it. However, a broader definition of CG is provided by Gregory and Simms 
(1999: 2), in which CG is seen as a combination of regulations, laws, rules and other 
activities that allows a firm to meet its legal obligations and general expectations in 
order to attract capital and perform efficiently. Accordingly, the main concern of a 
financial institution is building an environment of trust with its stakeholders and 
shareholders; hence, a corporation is then able to fulfil its general expectations and 
legal obligations.  
The failure of a number of banks and other financial institutions during the recent 
global financial crisis has been attributed to CG deficiencies. Senior management in 
certain institutions failed to disclose relevant financial and other information; thus, the 
failures of corporations such as WorldCom and Lehman Brothers have highlighted the 
importance of CG as those institutions were poorly managed by their board of 
directors.  
Since CG aims to establish the arrangements between different levels within 
organizations and externally with other stakeholders, it directly relates to the CSR 
activities of a company. Thus, improved performance in CG is directly related to 
improved CSR outcomes within the stakeholder CG framework. This implies that the 
CG structure also effectively arranges the socially expected outcomes in relation to 
society. In other words, CG is expected to internalize and establish a particular 
strategy in the relationship between the company (bank) and the society within which 
it operates.  
There are a number of methods by which the performances of CSR and CG can be 
measured. However, in terms of ‘accounting’ the most preferred method is to measure 
the amount and the nature of information disclosed by the organisations; in this study, 
by banks, in their annual reports and other documents. Therefore, this study utilises 
this disclosure as a method of measuring their performance in relation to CG and 
CSR. In particular, the study examines the relationship between CG and CSR through 
the information disclosed by the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Islamic banks. The 
GCC financial market is chosen because it is an emerging market in which very rapid 
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and dynamic growth and development is being experienced. Hence, measuring the 
CSR and CG behaviour as reported in the annual reports is important in order to 
suggest best CSR practices based on empirical evidence from the GCC banking 
industry.  
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This study aims to explore the CSR and CG performance of the selected GCC Islamic 
banks through the information they disclose in their annual reports within relative 
indices based on the standards developed by a number of international agencies 
specialising in Islamic finance. In addition, this study aims to establish if there is any 
relation/correlation between CSR and CG performance through respective disclosure 
indices. 
In responding to these aims, the following objectives are set: 
i. to develop an in-depth understanding of CSR and CG through Islamic moral 
economy and finance and their conventional counterparts; 
ii. to develop indices to evaluate the CSR and CG performance of the GCC 
Islamic banks; 
iii. to use content analysis to examine the annual reports to identify the disclosure 
level according to the indices developed; 
iv. to evaluate the CSR and CG performance in a comparative manner of Islamic 
banks in the GCC region (Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain) 
through the information the banks disclose in their annual reports; and 
v. to explore the relationship or correlation between CSR and CG performance 
through disclosure indices. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In line with the research aims and objectives, this research answers the following 
questions: 
i. What is the meaning of the CSR and CG concepts in the mainstream financial 
institutions?  
ii. What alternative conceptualisations and models have been developed by 
Islamic finance for CSR and CG? 
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iii. What is the level of CSR and CG disclosure in the GCC Islamic banks? and 
iv. Is there any correlation between CSR and CG disclosure indices? 
1.4 RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH 
The motivation for this research stems from the fact that the principles of CSR and 
CG that have gained popularity and acceptance in the West since the 1980s may be 
considered to be inherently Islamic practices in line with the Islamic ontology. 
Considering the growing nature of Islamic banking, it is important to understand if 
Islamic banks live up to the expectations identified by their moral economy. 
Therefore, an examination of CSR and CG practices in the GCC Islamic banks is 
important, as it is important to establish if such practices have become an integral part 
of their agenda. Furthermore, evaluating the socio-economic contribution of the GCC 
Islamic banks can help to develop new strategies and techniques towards practicing 
CSR in order to build comprehensive socially responsible financial institutions.  
The GCC countries have a rapidly developing financial industry and, therefore, it is 
important to raise the social and philanthropic activities of their banks through 
increasing their practice of CSR. Moreover, there is a lack of literature in terms of the 
CSR practices in the GCC region in general and the GCC banking sector in particular.  
Furthermore, as has been highlighted by writers, such as Hasan (2012), Islamic 
financial institutions have not developed best CG practices. Therefore, it is important 
to evaluate the CG practices of the GCC Islamic banks in order to identify if there are 
any distinguishing characteristics. 
Finally, it is argued that CG has an impact on CSR. This study, therefore, assesses if 
any such link exists between CG and CSR and if CG disclosure determines CSR 
disclosure. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research employs qualitative and quantitative methodologies, which in general 
include the testing of specific research hypotheses, sampling a representative 
population, data collection and data analysis. This research sampled 15 Islamic banks 
from the GCC countries in order to explore and evaluate their CSR and CG disclosure 
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performance. The research uses content analysis of the corporate annual reports 
according to the developed indices for both CSR and CG. After identifying their 
performance in relation to CSR and CG, further quantitative methods in the form of 
correlation and causality analysis is undertaken to measure any relationship between 
the CG and CSR.  
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH  
This dissertation is divided into 5 chapters as follows:  
Chapter 1 presents an introduction of the background, aims and objectives of the 
study, sets out the research rationale and motivation and the significance of this 
research.  
Chapter 2 presents the literature review. It defines CSR and CG, providing an in-
depth understanding. It highlights the challenges facing the Islamic banks in adopting 
CSR practices. In addition, it explores the existing literature surrounding CSR and CG 
disclosure.  
Chapter 3 discusses the research methods and the relevant data collection procedures, 
and how qualitative and quantitative data is explored to assess the content of CSR 
disclosure by the GCC Islamic banks. It then outlines the proposed theoretical 
framework of the study and highlights how the collected data is analysed.  
Chapter 4 presents the analysis results for the CSR and CG and uses these evaluations 
to assess the CSR and CG disclosure of the GCC Islamic banks. It also discusses the 
correlation and causality between CSR and CG disclosure for the sampled GCC 
Islamic banks. 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions, the limitations of the research and policy 
recommendations and suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW: CONVENTIONAL AND ISLAMIC 
PERSPECTIVES ON CSR AND CG 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Islamic finance emerged in modern times to respond to the financial needs of 
Muslims and beyond in a constructivist manner; and the main foundation of this 
constructivism is Islamic ethics and the Islamic legal code, or the Shari’ah. In 
defining the scope of Shari’ah, Imam Al-Ghazali sees the aspiration of Shari’ah as 
“promotion of the wellbeing of mankind, which lies in safeguarding their faith (dien), 
their human self (nafs), heir intellect (‘aql), their posterity (nasl). Whatever ensures 
the safeguarding of these five serves public interest and is desirable” (cited in Chapra, 
2000: 118; Asutay, 2007: 179). This interpretation also refers to a particular 
methodology, which is known as maqasid al-Shari’ah, which, in Ghazalian sense, is 
defined as ‘human well-being’. Therefore, it is important to identify that Islamic 
banks, among other financial and economic activity, should be compliant with this 
notion of maqasid, or, in other words, should also be socially responsible, as such a 
definition of Islam in the sense of the moral economy implies institutions including 
banks should have positive socio-economic consequences, such as contributing to 
human development. This is clear from the construct of the Islamic moral economy, 
as Islamic economics is constructed around philosophical axioms such as tawhid, 
adalah, rububiyyah, khilafah and tazkiyah (Ahmed, 1979: 230), which have social 
and developmentalist consequences.  
This chapter reviews the existing literature on CSR and CG disclosure in Islamic 
banks. Thus, this chapter first explores CSR through its definitions and aspects and 
then relates to Islamic moral economy understanding of CSR. 
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2.2. CSR: A LITERATURE REVIEW ON CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVES  
“If men are responsible for the known results of their actions, business 
responsibilities must include the known results of business dealings, whether there 
have been recognized by law or not” (Clark, 2009: 83) 
An increasing number of companies in the West are presently adopting CSR 
strategies as a result of social, economic, and environmental problems are faced in 
everyday life. According to European Commission (2001: 5), more companies in 
Europe have acknowledged the notion of CSR and included it in their strategic 
development plans.  
CRS can be described as transparent business actions that are based on ethical values, 
respect for people, communities, and the environment and which are in compliance 
with legal requirements. Thus, it is expected that socially responsible companies have 
a positive and productive impact on society. Furthermore, CSR encourages 
investment in human capital, environmental issues, and the relations with 
stakeholders. This, in turn, is expected to help to achieve a better competitive 
advantage for companies and coherence with the larger society in which the company 
operates.  
In addition, CSR is expected to improve the financial performance of an organization 
through improved brand image and reputation as well as increasing the ability to 
attract and retain a quality workforce. It also enhances the social practices within an 
institution through encouraging trainings, improving the quality of working 
conditions, and strengthening management-employee relations.  
Different organizations have framed different definitions of CSR, although there is 
considerable common ground between them. By and large, CSR is about how 
companies manage the business processes to produce an overall positive impact on 
society. In a more formal manner, CSR can be defined as the management’s 
obligation to make choices and actions that will contribute to the welfare and interest 
of society as well as the organization (Richard, 1998). Additionally, CSR initiatives 
also relate to creating a cleaner environment (European Union, 2001: 5).  
As can be seen, different sources have suggested various definitions of CSR, which 
are in general not very clear and, therefore; according to McWilliams et al. (2006: 1) 
they cause difficulties in theoretical development and analysis. However, the most 
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popular conceptual description of CSR can be found in Caroll (1991: 45), who 
proposes that the social responsibility of corporation includes four basic components: 
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society has of 
organizations at a given point in time.  
2.2.1 Theories of CSR 
Over the past 50 years, numerous theories on the strategic implications of CRS have 
been developed. The proponents of classical view of CSR believe that the 
“government’s job is not business, and business’s job is not government” (Levitt, 
1958:47 cited in McWilliams et al., 2006: 3) in which they are referring to 
governmental imposition of social expectations. Milton Friedman, the major 
proponent of this view, expresses the opinion that social issues are not in the interest 
of corporations as the ultimate goal of business is to maximize profit (cited in Dusuki, 
2008: 9) and adds that the existence of CSR shows the agency problem within the 
operations of firms (cited in McWilliams et al., 2006: 3). In addition, Friedman 
believes that philanthropic activities are nothing other than a misuse of corporate 
reserves, which may jeopardize the business and threaten the shareholder’s stake 
(cited in Dusuki, 2008: 9). 
In contrast, proponents of CSR suggest that broader social welfare beyond mere profit 
should be the concerns of businesses. According to this approach, businesses are parts 
of society and need people as much as people need organizations (Dusuki, 2008: 9). 
Thus, social contract theory encourages ethical and philanthropic strategy to be 
adopted by business alongside the traditional concerns of shareholders. While, the 
institutional approach is employed by Jennings and Zandbergen (1995: 1015) in order 
to study social responsibility in terms of environmental issues. The central idea of 
institutional theory is that institutions play a significant part in reaching an agreement 
within a firm on the subject of creating an “ecologically sustainable” organization 
(cited by McWilliams, 2006: 7). 
The contributions of Western scholars demonstrate that contemporary debates on 
CSR are fundamentally based on a Western orientation. In the Western approach to 
CSR materialistic attitudes are more dominate than ethical concerns. Furthermore, 
Mohammed (2007: 12) states that the majority of modern internationally accepted 
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theories of CSR have been developed in Europe and America, which highlights a gap 
in the literature on the concept of CSR in other cultural and religious environment. 
Thus, Islamic moral economy criticizes the Western view of CSR on the basis that it 
restricts itself to human perception and material factors (Dusuki, 2008: 12).  
The Western approach introduces confusion for managers, as there is no agreement on 
ethical or moral values to guide CSR. In order to solve this problem, recently a 
number of attempts have been taken through the formulation of new international 
CSR standards, norms, corporate code of conduct and guidelines. Examples are the 
Green Paper 336: Promoting a European Framework for CSR by the European 
Commission, and the Caux Round Table Principles for Business, which makes 
possible to share views of international managers from Japan, Europe and US on 
corporate ethics and behaviour (Mohammed, 2007: 13-14). However, it is important 
to stress that all of these standards are still based upon Western values.  
Consequently, the Western approach to CSR may not necessarily be fully accepted by 
the countries with different cultural and religious backgrounds. Hence, it is important 
in this study to evaluate the CSR practices of the GCC Islamic banks based on 
empirical evidence from the GCC Islamic banking industry by endogenising the local 
cultural and religious form, as explained and rationalised in the later sections. 
The following section provides brief explanations of the main theories; it should be 
noted that the theories of CSR could not be limited with the followings:  
Instrumental theory 
An essential perspective on CSR is the instrumental theory, which argues that socially 
responsible activities can improve the image of companies with no harm to the 
interest of shareholders. This theory has several well-known proponents, including 
Burke and Logsdon (1996), Fombrum et al. (2000), Johnson (2003), and Garriga and 
Melé (2004). 
 
Stakeholder theory 
The role of stakeholders in reference to CSR practice is very important. The 
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perception of stakeholders can determine the success and failure of an organization. 
This may explain the fact that stakeholder theory is one of the crucial and popular 
theories on CSR. In this approach, the moral and ethical aspects are emphasized 
alongside the business case for engaging in CSR (Donaldson and Preston, 1995 cited 
in McWilliams et al., 2006: 3, 7).  
This theory highlights the importance of all the stakeholders for an organization, all of 
whom seek different outcomes; the aim of the owners of the organization is profit 
maximisation, employees want a decent job with an excellent wages, suppliers look 
for a smooth business flow, customers wants an excellent high quality products and a 
high standards services whilst society expects the organization to fulfil all of the 
above in addition to paying taxes and protecting the environment from pollution. 
Furthermore, this theory helps to identify which social problems, needs, and interests 
that an organization needs to address in order to maintain a good image and support 
by the relevant stakeholder groups (Dusuki, 2005: 31).  
Legitimacy theory 
This theory stresses that CSR is a response to environmental pressures involving 
social, political and economic forces (Dusuki, 2005: 11). Therefore, firms ought to 
undertake ethical and socially responsible behaviours in order to carry on expanding 
or else society may jeopardize the survival of the firm (Davies, 1997). 
2.3 A LITERATURE SURVEY ON CG THROUGH CONVENTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
CG refers to the way in which a firm or organisation is structured and managed, and 
how the relationships between different levels within an organization and with other 
stakeholders externally are arranged. Since CG emerged as an essential practice area 
during 1980s, various sets of definitions have been applied to the concept based on 
the perspective of the person utilizing the concept and how they apply it. In a broader 
sense CG is defined as a combination of regulations, laws, rules and other activities 
that allow a firm to meet its legal obligations and general expectations in order to 
attract capital and perform efficiently (Gregory and Simms, 1999: 2).  
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There is a clear similarity between several definitions of CG. According to the OECD 
(2012: 5) report, CG structure specifies the distributions of rights and responsibilities 
amongst different participants in the corporations as it provides the basic guidelines 
and procedures for decision making to meet the firm’s objectives. Additionally, 
McRitchie (1999: 8) define CG as both the structure and relationship that determines 
corporate direction and performance. The International Chamber of Commerce, 
however, defines CG as a relationship matter, and that the BOD is accountable for the 
firm’s objectives as the firm itself conforms to the regulations and laws (Asutay, 
2013: 3). Although, it is challenging to establish a common definition of CG it can be 
argued that there is a pattern to these definitions and that corporation and financial 
institutions all work towards the well-being, social and environmental good of 
society. Moreover, the main concern of a financial institution is achieving 
trustworthiness towards its stakeholders including shareholders; hence, a corporation 
can then fulfil its general expectations and legal obligations (Gregory and Simms, 
1999: 3).  
2.3.1 Corporate Governance Models 
It is essential to highlight the main two CG systems, the Anglo-Saxon model and the 
European model, when discussing CG models. The Anglo-Saxon model is the 
dominate model and is adopted by most European countries. However, the majority of 
Islamic banks and institutions are in emerging markets, in which most governance 
institutions are not yet fully developed. In addition, the countries suffer from 
corruption, weak markets, poor accounting practices and a weak government.  
These two main models are described as follows:  
The Anglo-Saxon model  
One of the most dominant CG systems is the Anglo-Saxon model which follows the 
classical liberal view of Smithian views on capitalism. This model is based on the 
relationship between shareholders and managers, and the belief that government 
should only interfere when necessary. The model is reinforced by the agency theory, 
which is developed in the free market economy framework (Cernat, 2004; Clarke and 
Chanlat, 2009).  
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This model is known as profit-oriented behaviour in which the BOD supports the 
owners. It is based on the ‘fiduciary’ principle of the relationship between the 
mangers and shareholders. In terms of CG, the Angelo-Saxon model is mainly 
concerned with the protection and interest of the shareholders. However, profit-
oriented behaviour is a set of appropriate institutions to enhance their effectiveness in 
the Anglo-Saxon model. In the continental tradition, the company has an independent 
will; however, in theory what is good for the corporations might not be good for their 
shareholders. These differences penetrate to company law particulars such as 
shareholder rights, the role of statutory capital and the responsibility of the board 
(Cerant, 2010: 5)  
Furthermore, this model is well designed for protecting the rights of the shareholders, 
management and the BOD (Gracis, 2008: 24). The Anglo-Saxon model has a different 
set of regulations from the European model, which is discussed in the next section. 
Overall, the market-based model has no “supervisory boards, the power of employees 
is limited, its institutional portfolio investors are powerful, capital markets are strong 
and take over activates are common” (Clarke, 2009).  
European model  
The European Model of CG can be seen as superior to Anglo-Saxon model (Wojcik, 
2002), which is based on the German economic model, which has been the strongest 
economy in Europe with its unique nature of adopting a broader view than just the 
profit motive including the relationship built between banks, corporations and other 
firms. There is a distinctive separation between the responsibilities and duties of the 
supervisory board and the management in the European model. The Anglo-Saxon 
model which does not have a supervisory board and therefore limits the power of its 
employees. Additionally, Clark (209: 159) states that another characteristic of the 
German model is its egalitarian approach, which is also known as the Rhineland 
Capitalism. It is concerned with management objectives, long-term returns and 
consistent growth and stability. Thus, this model is based on stakeholder model in 
which internal and external stakeholders beyond shareholders are considered as part 
of an organisation. 
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2.3.2. Corporate Governance Theories 
After presenting the leading models in CG, this section presents the theories which 
shaped the models described above. 
Agency theory 
One of the main models of GC, the Anglo-Saxon model, is based on agency theory 
since as agency theory is characterized by the separation of the management and the 
ownership (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Agency simply implies that the 
relationship between the principles ‘stockholders’ and agent ‘managers’ is one in 
which the latter represent the interests of the former in running the business. 
However, rather than acting in the interest of the firm “self-interested opportunistic 
agents” require a supervisory board to solve any problems of conflict of interest that 
occur (Lewis, 2005: 14).  
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the agency theory is based on the idea that agents 
do not own the resources of the company but have the ability to manage a firm 
through their skills. In turn, the agents have different incentives from maximizing the 
shareholders’ returns (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Consequently, there is clearly a 
conflict of interest between the principle and the agent; for example, managers may 
act in their own best interests rather than maximizing shareholder wealth. These 
problems are exacerbated by asymmetric information and the cost of monitoring.  
Asymmetric information occurs when the managers happen to have more information 
than shareholder. Thus, Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that agents may follow certain 
policies in order to reduce the employment risk because of the asymmetric 
information. The goal of owner/shareholder of a business is to see the value of his/her 
wealth increase. In contrast, managers do not necessarily have the same incentives but 
may seek to increase their own interest using the shareholders’ money. Managers may 
have access to private jets or be members of other corporations, which may not 
necessary benefit the shareholders but will benefit the managers. Thus, agents may 
jeopardize the power given to them and act against the interest of the principle 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, Donaldson and Davis (1981) believe that 
managers do act in accordance with the interest of the shareholders.  
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Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory argues that the board and the management are a single collective 
stewardship team at the top of a corporation as it regards people to be trustworthy and 
responsible. Thus, the role of the board is not to direct and control the corporation but 
to support and assist the CEO and management team in accomplishing their goals, 
while managers are supportive and keen to perform in the best interest of their 
principles ‘the shareholders’ (Donaldson and Davis, 1989). A greater emphasis is 
placed by Stewardship theory on managers who aim not only aim to benefit 
themselves but also stockholders by improving the corporation’s performance. 
Therefore, “given the needs of managers for responsible, self directed work, 
organizations may be better served to free managers from subservience to non-
executive director dominated boards” (Donaldson and Davis, 1994).  
Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory is concerned with organizational management and ethics (Phillips, 
2003). It is believed that for any business to be successful it has to create value for 
customers, suppliers, employees, community and financier shareholders banks and 
other people with the money invested.  
Therefore, it is impossible to view any stakeholder in isolation; their interests have to 
be combined. Thus, the job of a manager is to figure out how the interest of these 
stakeholders can be achieved. There are several definitions of Stakeholder Theory. 
Friedman (1967: 46) gives a broad definition: “stakeholders are any group of 
individuals who can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives”. In other 
words, a stakeholder is any group of individuals who can affect or be affected by a 
company’s purpose. However, this definition is controversial because some may 
argue that everyone should be included because anyone can affect a company. 
Clarkson (1994) presents a different approach, as he argues that the firm is a system 
of stakeholders, which operates within a broader system of the society, which 
provides the necessary legal and market infrastructures for the firm’s activities.  
Stakeholder theory argues that focusing only on bankers and investors in a company 
may lead to missing what makes capitalism tick. The idea behind capitalism in this 
sense is that all of the stakeholders can work together. Blair (1995) supports 
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Clarkson’s approach that the main objective of management is to increase the wealth 
creation by firm. He argues that for this objective to be achieved stakeholder groups 
are vital as they can affect how you create value for customers, suppliers, employees, 
community and financiers.  
However, the issue of whether firms ought to be concerned about the interest of 
stakeholders rather than only shareholders is controversial. Since stakeholder theory 
has been adopted in a number of European countries, such as Greece, Germany, 
France and Spain, it is important to discuss the ethical, management and business 
perspectives of the theory. Jensen (2002: 302) states that although stakeholder theory 
aims to combine the interests of stakeholders, it is still seen as an obstacle to 
maximize the interest of the stakeholders when there is a conflict of interest. 
However, it is not only important to look at maximizing the interests of the 
stakeholders but also maximizing the firm to creating a better society. In a moral and 
ethical sense, Jensen (2002: 302) states that: “the intuition behind this criterion is 
simply that (social) value is created when a firm produces an output or set of output 
that are valued by its customers at more than the value of the inputs it consumes (as 
valued by their suppliers) in such production. Firm value is simply the long-term 
market value of this stream of benefit.  
Transaction cost economics theory 
Transaction cost economics theory (TCE) was introduced by Coase who assesses the 
nature of firm and organization not only by studying the behaviour of these firms but 
also by examining the reason behind having these firms in the first place. TCE Theory 
is an example of the agency problem and is “derived from an inter-disciplinary of law, 
economics and organizations as it is concerned with governance of contractual 
relations in transactions between two parties” (Coase, 1937:398).  
Class hegemony theory and managerial hegemony theory 
In addition to the above theories, this should be discussed as it summarizes the overall 
concept of the function of the CG and the relationship behind the rules and 
regulations of who is responsible for what and identifying the cost to the company. 
Class Hegemony Theory gives responsibility to the directors, in contrast to 
Managerial Hegemony Theory, which gives management enough trust to maintain 
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their daily operations. Eisenhardt (1989) states that is the development of asymmetric 
information between directors, management and shareholders that gives managers 
control over the board which leaves the board with in a weak position when 
representing the shareholders’ interests.  
After presenting the conventional perspectives on CSR and CG, the following section 
discusses the Islamic equivalent of these concepts. 
2.4. ISLAMIC MORAL ECONOMY AS THE BASE OF ISLAMIC CSR AND 
CG  
This section presents a possible conceptual framework of CSR and CG in Islam. It 
locates CSR and CG within the ethical belief and moral values of Islam, as the 
Islamic moral economy suggests that all agents adopt ethical behaviours, which lead 
to social good through social justice and responsibility. Thus, axiomatic approach, 
which is presented below, is considered to be “a crucial initial step in any model 
development in Islamic economics” (Haneef, 2005: 7). The main axioms are: 
encompassing unity (tawhid), social justice and beneficence (adalah and ihsan), free 
will (ikhtiyar), mandatory responsibilities (fardh actions), growth in harmony 
(tazkiyah) and perfection oriented development path (rububiyah). All these axioms 
can be generated from and within the ethical statements and norms in the Qur’an and 
Sunnah. Based on these axioms a CSR and CG framework can be developed to 
provide rationale as to why Islamic banks should be socially responsible and should 
have a good practice in CG (Naqvi, 1981: 2).   
In order to construct a more coherent argument about CSR and CG within Islamic 
teaching, the next section presents the foundational axioms of Islamic moral economy 
by which it is possible to rationalize and systematize an Islamic CSR and CG 
framework.  
Tawhid (Encompassing Unity) 
The most fundamental of the ethical notions in Islam comes from faith in God which 
is articulated with the understanding that everything in life is connected through the 
creator and therefore they have to be understood within the encompassing unity 
(tawhid). Therefore, the rest of the axioms of Islamic principles and religious ethics 
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are derived from the concept of tawhid (Naqvi, 1981: 2). Such an encompassing 
ethical system, through maqasid al-Shari’ah (objective of Shari’ah), which is 
interpreted as ‘human well-being’, incorporates every aspect of individual behaviour 
in daily life.  
The concept of unity, therefore, represents the core of the Islamic faith and the belief 
that there is only one God who is worth worshiping and submitting to Allah’s will. 
People are free in their political, social and economic endeavours but bound by the 
Shari’ah. Thus, any economic system that breaches human’s well-being is fraudulent, 
while attempts to implement riba (usury) or any form of economic and financial 
practice that contradicts with the Shari’ah’s system, cannot contribute to the Islamic 
social system (Mohammed, 2007: 111).  
The next section highlights how the concept of tawhid integrates the political, social, 
economic and religious aspects of humankind and determines the relationship 
between Allah and his vice-regency (khalifah) or humans on earth through articulating 
other axioms. 
Rububiyyah (Oneness of God) 
The axiom of rububiyyah (the oneness of God) is probably the second most important 
concept or axiom in terms of the development of Islamic moral economy, because it 
refers to the economic, social, human and environmental development. Hence, 
rububiyyah is seen as another element of tawhid. In terms of rububiyyah, Asutay 
(2012: 105) argues that since CSR and good CG practice is ”an inherited part of IBF 
[Islamic banks and financial institutions], as IME principles and foundational axioms 
directly refer to CSR related activities. In other words, by definition and construct IBF 
has to comply with CSR [and CG] expectations”. 
Al’Adl (Justice) 
The concept of al’adl (justice) in Islam is another foundational axiom related to the 
concept of tawhid and is concerned with the expectation that the doctrine of justice 
should dominate all aspects of human life on earth. Hence, justice is seen as an 
integral part of the social, economic and political process in Islam (Ahmed, 2003: 51). 
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Additionally, Chapra (1992: 209) states that “it is impossible to conceive of an ideal 
Muslim society where justice has not been established”.  
Therefore, Islam places significant emphasis on the important feature of economic 
behaviour, namely justice, which can be thought of as the obligation of humans 
towards their communal responsibility, as mentioned in several verses in the Qur’an 
(MacAuliffe, 2002: 5). Thus, in the economic sphere, one important element of Islam 
is that social justice should be part of all of economic activities, such as the 
acquisition of wealth, production, consumption, and regulation through transactions. 
Thus, elements such as interest (riba), gambling (maysir) and excessive uncertainty 
(gharar) are prohibited as they lead to inequity (Iqbal, 1981: 31).  
The understating of the notion that mankind is the khalifah of Allah on earth 
necessitates that humans ought to reflect al’adl or social justice and thus maintain 
justice in society and in all the socioeconomic affairs. Humans ought to be treated 
respectfully and their dignity be protected from any form of inequality or 
discrimination socially. The axiom of justice creates balance and harmony in society, 
which is consistent in the Islamic social system maqasid Al Shari’ah that leads to the 
well-being (falah) of humans and allow them to live a decent life (hayat tayyibah) 
(Chapra, 1992: 8).  
Thus, businesses in Islam should practice distributive justice within the 
socioeconomic environment as part of the CSR and CG practices. According to 
Chapra (1992: 210), “this is the raison d’être of society itself”. Muslim scholars and 
Islamic jurists agree that it is the responsibility of humans to look after the poor and to 
ensure that others are treated fairly, for example by maintaining fairness in wage 
distribution. This highlights the importance to protect the needy in society (Siddiqi, 
1995: 9). The Islamic attitude towards justice, hence, requires that all segments of 
society contribute to the needs of the poor. Thus by performing zakat people are 
fulfilling their duties towards maintaining justice and equality.  
Ikhtiyar (Free will) 
The axiom of free will can be defined as the ability of individual to make choices and 
take decisions in certain situations; this can be seen on several verses in the Qur’an 
and hadith (Naqvi, 1981). It should be noted that Hayek (1948: 20) stated that people 
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ought to have the free will to choose as “no one individual has the exclusive right to 
reason, and hence what is best can be discovered only by a process of trial and error”. 
This can be interpreted in the classical economic model, which is best seen through 
the market behaviour of the individual.  
According to western social philosophy, people are not limited in their rights and 
authority over private property, which may allow them to maximise their utility. 
However, from the Islamic perspective people are restricted as all property belongs to 
Allah; therefore, people do not have spiritual right to what they earn or inherit 
(Mohammed, 2007: 132). In summary, people are bound to act and behave according 
to Allah’s commandments to avoid punishment and gain reward in this life and in the 
hereafter. For that reason, people should fulfil their obligations and act socially 
responsible in order to contribute to the well-being of society and safeguard the 
welfare of society. Hence, Islam provides people with laws and discipline towards 
fulfilling their obligations and to act in a socially responsible manner and to 
contribute towards the wellbeing of society.  
Fardh (Responsibility)  
In this section, fardh (mandatory responsibility), which relates to the concept of free 
will in that they both represent a balance to each other, is discussed. This axiom 
simply identifies that in the working of an economic order, social good cannot be left 
to voluntary action, otherwise people, being rational individuals, may not fulfil such 
expectations. Therefore, Islam complements voluntary action with mandatory 
responsibility in order that the social good can be achieved and social justice can be 
delivered. The axiom of responsibility distinguishes itself from the other ethical 
axioms given the fact that the rest of the axioms consequent on unity and free will. 
Asutay (2012: 109) places great emphasis on the concepts of social good, social 
justice and moral oriented developmentalism. The act of zakat (charity), as Asutay 
(2012:93) states is that “funds should be created with the objective of serving the 
social and developmental needs of Muslim societies”. According to one of the 
prophet’s hadith, charity can be defined as giving some of one’s earnings and 
property to the needy as a symbol of love, respect, such as zakah, the third pillar of 
Islam, which is regarded as a religious tax, paid by Muslims who have wealth above a 
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certain limit, at a rate fixed by Shari’ah (Abbasi, 2012: 122). Thus, it is the 
responsibility of each individual to pay charity for the poor in society.  
The act of zakat builds a trusting relationship as it encourages the wealthy to share 
their wealth with others and at the same time feel that they are fulfilling Allah’s 
commandments.  
Although the responsibility of businesspeople from an Islamic perspective is 
discussed in the above section, it is important to further illustrate their role in society 
in relation to this axiom. It is believed that in a Muslim society, it is the responsibility 
of businesses to make profit legally and to avoid paying/charging riba (interest) 
(Ahmed, 2003: 60). Islam makes society the prime responsibility for businesses and 
then individuals. It is clear that the concept of responsibility, as with the other axioms, 
is integrated into society and seen as the core value of CSR in Islam. In order to 
demonstrate this argument, Islam encourages individuals and financial institutions to 
make profit but also condemns greed. Thus, paying zakat allows businesses and 
businesspeople to make profits while fulfilling the responsibility of social obligations.  
Tazkiyyah (Growth and development)  
The axiom of tazkiyyah “calls for growth with purification that should incorporate the 
good of others and be conducted with ethical and moral considerations” (Asutay, 
2007: 170). The core value of the concept behind tazkiyyah is to “over come the 
conflict between individuals and society” (Asutay, 2012: 95). As is argued by Asutay 
(2007) the understanding of tazkiyyah encourages development, growth and self-
purification; hence, it is aimed to achieve spiritual and moral development, in addition 
to achieving self-purification. Thus, it directly indicates that CSR and developing 
good CG practice is an essential and integrated part of Islamic moral economy as also 
suggested by tazkiyah. 
In concluding the axiomatic approach in rationalising and systemising the Islamic 
CSR and CG practice, as explained the Islamic economic system aims at the 
development of moral-oriented economy in the Islamic world (Siddiqi, 1981;Al-
Ghazali, 1994; Naqvi, 1994; Chapra. 2002; Sirageldin, 2002). Thus, the Islamic moral 
economy evidently has a different agenda from the conventional economic system, 
which is, based primarily on maximizing its profit. In summary, the ethical axioms of 
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Islam that have been discussed refer to peoples’ relationships with Allah, as an 
individual or from a broader concept the universe. Islam aims to create a responsible 
person who behaves justly and is considerate towards the socioeconomic environment 
for which they responsible. This makes CSR and CG practices as an integral part and 
parcels of Islamic institutions rather than exogenous institutions and practices. 
2.5 ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES AND MODELS ON CSR 
Asutay (2007: 171) states “Islamic economics aimed at a world order, where the 
ontological and epistemological sources, the Qu’ran and hadith, determine the 
framework of the economic value system, the operational dimension of the economy 
and also the economic and financial norms of the individual Muslims”. Therefore, it 
can be argued that Islamic banking by definition has to be social responsibly. 
Therefore, the concept of CSR is vital for Islamic banks, which are expected to define 
their objective functions beyond maximizing their wealth in line with Islamic 
principles.  
The operations of Islamic and conventional western banks may be different. However, 
certain ethical western banks have a number of similar dimensions of CSR to that of 
Islamic banks; for example, good practices on human resources, human rights, 
environmental and philanthropic engagement. Dusuki (2005: 85) states that these 
dimensions are consistent with Islamic teachings and the spirit of the Qu’ran and 
Sunnah.  
The conceptual framework of CSR in Islam is measured against two elements, 
financial and social. The former is concerned with profit-making and latter with the 
means of achieving social good. The maqasid al Shari’ah suggests that Islamic 
financial institutions are expected to promote strong moral values and therefore 
contribute to socio-economic development. This is based on the belief that business 
has a responsibility towards society which includes not harming individuals, society 
and the environment in general and, thus, responding to the well-being of others.  
Ethical and social responsibility has been an important part of Islamic business and 
finance since the revelation of Qur’an more than 14 centuries ago. Therefore, despite 
the contemporary nature of CSR as a concept, it is rooted in the ontology and history 
of Islam, as the Shari’ah determines the outlines of all aspects of well-being including 
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businesses and society. Mohammed (2007: 96) in an attempt to justify the Islamic 
origins of CSR suggests that since the Prophet Muhammad’s time CSR was 
conducted in all sphere of life. This can be seen in the practices of the Prophet and his 
companions as to how they adopted and applied social responsibilities in their daily 
life as well as in delivering their duties. 
As for the models of Islamic CSR, when discussing the Islamic banking system it is 
essential to recognize its main goal is different from the conventional banking system, 
as its aim is not restricted to profit maximization. The conventional banking system 
operates in the dominant capitalist economic system but on the capitalist ideology, 
which is considered having ‘moral deficiency’.  Therefore, society and the economic 
system require having an ethical frame based on values and norms in order to remind 
us of our societal obligations and to encourage us to act in a responsible way towards 
society, employees, environment etc. Therefore, as stated by Al-Zuhayli (2003: 350) 
“The primary goal of Islamic financial institutions is not profit-making, but the 
endorsement of (the) social goals of socio-economic development and the alleviation 
of poverty”. 
As part of such ethical foundation and perspectives, various models of Islamic CSR 
has been developed in the literature, which are presented as follows: 
Chapra’s Model 
Chapra’s model asserts that although Islamic banks ought to maximize profit as 
conventional banks do, they have to achieve their Islamic economic objectives by 
“including social justice, equitable distribution of income and wealth and promoting 
economic development” (cited by Lewis and Algaoud, 2005: 9). Academics, such as 
Dusuki (2005: 82) and Siddiqi (2001: 52) believe that equality based banking is the 
core value of an Islamic banking system, which differs it from the conventional 
banking system. The socioeconomic goals of social justice, equality and economic 
growth are best achieved through equality-based system. Furthermore, this model 
reflects Shari’ah.  
Dusuki (2005: 82) states “the primary goal of Islamic financial institutions is not 
profit making, but the endorsement of social goals of socio economic development 
and the alleviation of poverty... Islamic financial institutions attempt to link the 
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economic and social development goals in a harmonized overall framework based on 
Islamic teaching. They avoid excessive speculative or untruthful transactions, which 
can have an adverse economic and social effect on the nation”. Thus, Islamic banks 
are required to make profit on the basis of contributing and using this profit for the 
development of the social well-being.  
Ismail’s model 
Ismail have presented a similar model to Chapra’s, but placed a greater emphasis on 
the behaviour of Islamic banks and suggested that Islamic banks have to make profits, 
albeit in accordance with Shari’ah (Ismail, 2002). As discussed previously Ismail’s 
main argument is that financial institution and banks ought to act responsibly towards 
its stakeholders in order to achieve the Islamic socioeconomic objective of promoting 
equality and social justice.  
Given the fact that Islamic banks obligatory pay zakat as part of their social welfare, 
Ismail argues that other social contributions to society are irrelevant and unnecessary. 
In this context, Dusuki (2007: 32) posits that having a responsibility towards their 
shareholder and depositor should be the banks’ main responsibility and they should 
not to be concerned with other social responsibility within their environment. 
Therefore, this model views IFIs as commercial institutions and that the primary aim 
is profit maximization but still operating in accordance with the shari’ah (Sairally, 
2006: 67).  
2.6. ISLAMIC CG: DEFINITION, DESCRIPTION AND CONCEPTUAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF CG 
It has been argued that Islamic economic operations and transactions are known for 
being ethical and are bound by the Shari’ah frame. In line with this, in developinga 
frame for Islamic CG, Lewis (2005: 19) placed great emphasis on the issue of shura 
(consultation) and ensuring that decisions are made in compliance with Shari’ah. In 
representing Islamic GC he stated that “since the Holy Qur’an clearly mandates that 
any decision involving more than one party requires access and consultation on the 
basis of principles of shura, Islam encourages the participants to work together freely 
and frankly when arriving at decisions. Institution of a shuratic decision-making 
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process explains how decision-making in business and other activities can meet 
Islamic moral values” Lewis (2005: 16).   
As is illustrated in the CSR section, the ultimate goal of Islamic economy is to 
establish a balanced society which is just, fair and trustworthy in terms of the 
socioeconomic welfare of society. Thus, all its institutions, financial and non-
financial, are obliged to fulfil these morals in response to maqasid Al Shari’ah; which 
also impacts the CG. 
According to the Islamic ontology Islamic CG is formed and determined by the nature 
of the structure of Islam. The main framework of CG in Islam is articulated in the 
ethical and moral concepts of Shari’ah, shura and tawhid (Lewis, 2005: 19), as 
identified by the Islamic moral economy precepts discussed above. The CG model in 
Islam is mainly concerned about the equal protection of the stakeholder’s rights 
regardless of whether or not they hold shares, not just protecting the interest of the 
shareholders. Therefore, it is vital to discuss the CG models from an Islamic 
perspective and observe how IFIs adopt these models in their operations.  
However, Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) argues that there are several obstacles from an 
Islamic point of view regardless of the ethical concept of CG. First, the main source 
of authority in Islam is based on shari’ah, which differs from western sources of 
authority, which are mainly derived from ‘secular humanist’ social authority. Second, 
western corporates, firms and other financial institutions are strongly rooted in self-
interest rather than in the interest of the community and the society. Finally, the 
overall CG model is integrated in Agency Theory, which concerns the relationship 
between stakeholders and the management rather than stewardship theory (Davis et 
al., 1997).  
The following section summarises the main pillars of Islamic CG within the defined 
Islamic moral economy’s axiomatic framework. 
Shari’ah Governance 
Shari’ah governance is a set of organizational arrangements, which are specific to 
IFIs and primarily ensure that all internal and external practices and operations are 
within Shari’ah compliance. This results in the need for a Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
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(SSB), which can ensure control and justice in financial transactions in each of the 
IFIs. The SSB increases confidence and trust in the IFIs with respect to their 
compliance to Shari’ah principles and ensures that all internal and external operations 
are Shari’ah compliant.  
In addition, Islamic CG refers to stakeholders type governance mechanism by which 
all the stakeholders’ interest must be considered in articulating a best practice of CG. 
This is defined by Islamic moral economy, axiomatic approach of which discussed 
above. 
Shura 
The concept of shura means consultation and seeking the opinions of others to reach a 
decision that will eventually reflect on the social well-being of the society, firm etc. 
Baydoun (1999) argues that the process of decision-making according to shura is a 
way of explaining how IFIs and other firms act and carry out their activities in a way 
that would meet Islamic ethical principles for every member of the firm ought to 
contribute to fulfil the firm’s goals, objectives and vision. Additionally, Zulkifli 
(2008: 11) states that since stakeholders are seen as the vice-regent of Allah on earth 
they have a crucial role to play and that is to sustain the value of “distributive justice 
via the Shuratic process”. In other words, stakeholders are required to practice shura 
and since they participate heavily in decision-making this allows them to contribute 
more to state affairs, firms, corporations and other financial institution.  
Independence of the SSB 
Members of the SSB are appointed by the shareholders as part of the internal GC in 
IFIs in order to ensure that all actions and operations are carried out in compliance 
with shari’ah and to protect the rights and interest of the stakeholders and depositors. 
Hence, their independence should be dominant (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006: 21). The 
main role of SSB in IFIs is to review all the BOD decisions and financing proposals 
and to ensure they are shari’ah compliant. However, Korshid (2012: 9) argues that 
there have been several problems that occur in relation to the Shari’ah scholars. These 
scholars are represented on more than 64 boards of different banks. Thus, it may be 
argued that these IFIs and banks may be only using the name of the scholars in order 
to avoid conflicts. The number of meetings that these Shari’ah scholars attend is not 
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disclosed (Korshid, 2012: 10).  
Competence 
The issue of competency is important given the limited number of Shari’ah scholars 
who are expert in law and finance. They are expected to be extremely knowledgeable 
about finance and Islamic finance. The SSB committee members also ought to have 
relevant training courses and programmes. Shari’ah scholars who are meant to bear 
responsibilities for CG in Islamic banks, firms and other institutions ought to have the 
competency and utilize all their knowledge to serve these IFIs and to be familiar with 
Shari’ah updates within Islamic finance (NMB, 2012/2013: 17).  
Disclosure 
The majority of Islamic banks including in the Gulf region are not fully developed, 
since they are headquartered in emerging markets, which suffer from political and 
economic corruption. As a result, these countries set insufficient disclosure levels. 
Hence, “information relating to Shariah advisory functions would strengthen the 
credibility that the offered services are essentially distinct from conventional ones 
and, furthermore, promote market discipline” (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006: 21).  
Confidentially and Consistency 
In regard to the issue of confidentiality, given nature of their field members of the 
SSB are able to access confidential materials and information on competitive IFIs in 
the market. Thus, Islamic banks should not appoint members of its SSB to other 
Islamic banks in order to avoid conflict of interest. The issue of consistency refers to 
the consistency of Shari’ah decision-making. The committee of the SSB should act in 
a way that is effective and sufficient to maintain consumer confidence (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006: 19).  
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion surveyed the available body of knowledge in relation to 
CSR and CG through conventional and Islamic perspectives. The distinction mainly 
relates to the source of knowledge and practice; Islamic source of knowledge is divine 
sources which shapes the nature of practice with the objective of developing Islamic 
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moral economy based CSR and CG. Based on such substantiation, this research aims 
to explore the every day Islamic banking for their practice of CSR and CG as 
documented through the annual reports, which constitute the main aim of this study. 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter reviews and analyses the literature on CSR and CG disclosure in 
Islamic banks. This chapter discusses the research methodology for measuring the 
CSR and CG disclosure performance of the major 15 Islamic banks in the Gulf region 
through the examination of the ‘ethicality index’. This is achieved by examining the 
CSR and the CG communicated in the annual reports of these banks. In doing so, this 
chapter discusses the research methods, strategy, design, sampling, analysis, 
limitations and difficulties. In other words, this chapter helps to construct and choose 
the appropriate research design and methodology that is utilized in this research. 
3.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology can be approached on a number of axes: it can be 
quantitative and/or qualitative; applied or basic; and deductive or inductive. In 
general, research methodology can be described in a functional manner as “how a 
researcher can go forward to study a phenomenon properly” (Asutay, 2007: 3). Thus, 
research methodology in a practical manner helps to examine and evaluate the 
effectiveness of a certain theory about society.  
Since this research is based on the information disclosed in the annual reports the 
study is based on a qualitative research methodology. Parkinson and Drislane describe 
qualitative research as “using methods such as participant observation or case studies 
which result in a narrative, descriptive account of a setting or practice” (2011: 2). In 
referring to the social constructivist nature of qualitative research, this research aims 
to measure the CSR practices, understanding, behaviours and perceptions through the 
information disclosed in the GCC Islamic banks annual reports. 
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3.3. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
To conduct a well-structured research it is essential to adopt a certain type of research 
strategy depending on the tested hypothesis. There are two reasons for conducting 
research; either to fill a knowledge gap or to solve a problem. This research aims to 
fill a gap by providing a case-based research. (Timothy J and Yair Levy, 2008)  
There are several definitions of research strategy: Saunders et al. define research 
strategy as “the general plan of how the researcher will go about answering the 
research questions” (2009: 600). Thus, in any social sciences research, research 
strategy works as a guideline to the research process in order to achieve the overall 
objective of the researched hypothesis. There are two main types of approaches that a 
researcher can adopt depending on the research type: deductive and inductive 
strategy. 
Inductive research is seen as “a study in which theory is developed from observation 
of empirical reality; thus general inferences are induced from particular instances” 
(Saunders et al., 2007: 117). Thus, the inductive approach works on first collecting 
the data, then developing a hypothesis from the data collected. Moreover, Blaxter et 
al. state that the inductive approach “involves in depth understanding and competent 
knowledge about the research idea, which allows the researcher to reveal different 
alternative explanations of the problem” (2006: 71). In addition, Saunders et al. 
(2009) argue that the inductive approach involves a degree of ambiguity in the 
research, since in the inductive approach the researcher starts with a specific 
hypothesis and moves into a general theory (Blaikie, 2007). 
Deductive reasoning has been the most popular approach in conducting scientific 
research. Miller states in deductive analysis “the research is testing whether a 
hypothesis is correct or not and hence the researcher moves from the general to the 
specific” (1998: 5). The researcher, therefore, starts with a general spectrum of 
content and limits it down to specific conclusion based on the tested hypothesis.  
In short, the difference between the inductive and the deductive approach is on how 
the hypothesis is reached whilst conducting a research. 
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Accordingly, the strategy pursued in this research is the deductive approach since the 
aim is to test a hypothesis, which necessitates moving from general theory to a 
specific conclusion.  
3.4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research design sets out the structure of the study in terms of how the data is 
collected, the rationale behind the data collection method and what difficulties were 
faced by the researcher while conducting the research (Saunders et al., 2007: 131). 
Similarly, Hussey and Hussey state that “research design is the overall approach to 
the research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis 
of the data” (1997: 54), while Cooper and Schindler consider that research design is 
seen as the “blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data” (2011: 
147).  
Within such a definition, there are several types of design for each research: it is 
either based on exploratory studies or formal study, as well as other elements such as 
descriptive research, historical research, correlational study and experimental 
research. Therefore, researchers must choose the appropriate research design in order 
to develop a comprehensive understanding of the study.  
Hence, it is important to explain the reason for choosing an exploratory research 
design when measuring CSR and CG in Islamic banks. According to Cooper and 
Schindler (2011: 148), most research studies in the social sciences are exploratory. 
Exploratory study is seen as a research that requires in-depth study of the literature in 
order to identify the key variable issues of the study to develop a better understanding 
of the research question. An explanatory study begins by testing the hypothesis in 
order to explore the relationship or casualty between two or more variables to finally 
result with an observed analysis.  
In contrast the formal case study “begins with a descriptive account of the current 
situation followed by the hypotheses or research question” (Cooper and Schindler, 
2011: 148). Moreover, if answering the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions which could be 
associated with a specific case study drawback. Descriptive study is used if the 
research purpose is to present a description of the relationship between different 
variables and how a variable can affect another variable. In other words, it is the use 
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of data, literature and studies to further explain a research problem (Yin, 2003).  
According to Baily (1978), the two remaining research designs are unique since each 
has its own purpose when conducting a study. Thus, Wiersma defines historical 
design as “an original or first-hand account of the event or experience” (1995: 234). 
In other words, it is a type of research that utilizes past research, events, and primary 
or secondary data to establish a new hypothesis. Whereas, the correlational study can 
be defined as examining the relationship between two variables, while the classical 
experimental research design enables the researcher to examine if one or two 
variables may affect the part or all the results of the study (Baily, 1978).  
Since this study aims at measuring the CSR and CG disclosure performance of the 
GCC Islamic banks, it is designed as an explanatory case study.  
3.5. RESEARCH METHOD 
Research method is defined as “a technique for collecting data. It can include 
instruments, such as questionnaire, or a structured interview, or participant 
observation in which a research listens and watches others” (Bryman, 2001: 27). 
Depending on the research questions and the aims of the research, the research 
method can either be quantitative or qualitative. According to Cooper and Schindler, 
the quantitative research method can be defined as “relying on quantitative 
information (i.e. numbers and figures), while qualitative studies base their accounts 
on qualitative information (i.e. words, sentences and narratives)” (2011: 144). In other 
words, when the aim is to explore, qualitative method oriented data is collected; 
however, when the research aim is to evaluate and examine, then quantitative method 
oriented data is collected. The data analysis method in the form of quantitative and 
qualitative method is, then, determined by the nature of data as well as the research 
questions.  
Since the main objectives of this study are to empirically evaluate the CSR and CG 
disclosure performance of the selected GCC Islamic banks and to establish if there is 
any correlation and potential causality between CSR and CG performance through 
respective disclosure indices scores, it will benefit from a quantitative research 
method. The data is collected through the qualitative method of content analysis, 
which is based on the communicated information in the annual reports of the sampled 
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GCC Islamic banks. This research, hence, transforms the qualitatively collected data 
through content analysis into quantitative data for analysis by coding the categories in 
the transformation process.  
3.5.1. Sampling 
The sampled banks for this study have been chosen from five countries in the GCC: 
Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The banks selected are the major 
Islamic banks in terms of their asset size; and their annual reports were collected for 5 
years from 2008 to 2012. A total of 3 Islamic banks were sampled from each country, 
making a total sample of 15 (see Table 3.1). This means that 75 annual reports are 
sampled for content analysis.   
Table 3.1: Sampled Banks 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia UAE 
Ithmar KFH QIB AlRajhi Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) 
Al 
Baraka KIB IIB AlJazira 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 
(ADIB) 
ABC Boubyan MR Alinma 
Emirates Islamic Bank 
(EIB) 
3.5.2. Data Collection Method 
The data collected from the annual reports were analysed using content analysis, 
which involves particular techniques such as coding the text and analysing it through 
statistical analysis (Krippendorff, 1980: 18). The text was according to the, individual 
indices that were developed for CSR and CG disclosures through the dimensions 
developed from the international Islamic finance standards such as IFSB and 
AAOIFI. The indices with their dimensions and statements can be found in Table 3.2. 
As can be seen, under CSR disclosure index, there are ten dimensions with a total of 
82 statements; and 96 statements under nine dimensions for the GC Disclosure index. 
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Table 3.2: Index for CSR and CG Disclosure Performance 
Islamic CSR Dimensions 
 Mission and Vision Statement 
1 Commitments to operate within Shari’ah principles/ideals 
2 Commitments to provide returns within Shari’ah principles/ideals 
3 Focus on maximizing shareholders returns 
4 Current and future directions in serving the needs of Muslim communities 
5 Commitments to engage in investment activities that comply with Shari’ah 
principles 
6 Commitments to engage in financing activities that comply with Shari’ah 
principles 
7 Commitments to fulfil contractual relationships with various stakeholders via 
contract ('uqud) statements 
8 Appreciation to stakeholders and customers 	  
BOD and Top Management 
1 Names of board members 
2 Positions of board members 
3 Pictures of board members 
4 Profile of board members 
5 Shareholdings of board members 
6 Multiple-directorships exist among board members  
7 Membership of audit committees 
8 Board composition: executive vs non-executive 
9 Role duality: CEO is Chairman of board 
10 Names of management team 
11 Positions of management team 
12 Pictures of management team 
13 Profile of management team 	  
Theme: interest-free and Islamically acceptable ideals 
Products and Services 
1 No involvement in non-permissible activities 
2 Involvement in non-permissible activities-% of profit  
3 Reason for involvement in non-permissible activities  
4 Handling of non-permissible activities 
5 Introduced new product 
6 Approval ex ante by SSB for new product 
7 Basis of Shari’ah concept in approving new product  
8 Glossary/definition of products 
9 Investment activities–general 
10 Financing projects–general 	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Theme: Developmental and Social Goals 
Zakah, Charity, Benevolent Funds and Other Strategic Social Development 
Theme: underlying philosophy and values 
1 Bank liable for zakah 
2 Amount paid for zakah 
3 Sources of zakah 
4 Uses/beneficiaries of zakah 
5 Balance of zakah not distributed–amount 
6 Reasons for balance of zakah 
7 SSB attestation that sources and uses of zakah according to Shari’ah  
8 SSB attestation that zakah has been computed according to Shari’ah  
9 Zakah to be paid by individuals-amount 
10 Sources of charity (saddaqa)  
11 Uses of charity (saddaqa) 
12 Sources of qard al-hassan  
13 Uses of qard al-hassan 
14 Policy for providing qard al-hassan 
15 Policy on non-payment of qard al-hassan 	  
Commitment towards Employees 
1 Employees appreciation 
2 Number of employees 
3 Equal opportunities policy 
4 Employees welfare 
5 Training: Shari’ah awareness 
6 Training: other 
7 Training: student/recruitment scheme  
8 Training: monetary 
9 Reward for employees 	  
Commitment towards Debtors 
1 Debt policy 
2 Amount of debts written off 
3 Type of lending activities-general 
4 Type of lending activities-detailed 	  
Commitment towards Community 
1 Women’s Branch  
2 Creating job opportunities 
3 Support for org 
4 Participation in government social activates  
5 Sponsor community activities 
6 Commitment to social role 
7 Conferences on Islamic economics 
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Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
Theme: Reviews by Shari’ah Supervisory Board 
1 Names of members 
2 Pictures of members 
3 Remuneration of members 
4 Report signed by all members 
5 Number of meetings held 
6 Examination of all business transactions ex ante and ex post 
7 Examination of a sample of business transactions ex ante and ex post 
8 Report defects in product: specific and detailed 
9 Recommendation to rectify defects in product 
10 Action taken by management to rectify defects in production  
11 Distribution of profits and losses comply to Shari’ah 	  
Environment  
1 Introduction of green products  
2 Glossary/definition of green product 
3 Investment in recycling bin project (recycling for future) and other sustainable 
development 
4 Amount of donation in environmental awareness 
5 Financing in any project which may lead to environmental damage 
6 Investment in sustainable development projects 
7 Initiatives to mitigate environmental impact of product and service and extent of 
impact mitigation  
8 Focus on risk-based corrective actions 	  
Research and Development 
1 Promoting of research and development 
2 Capacity building 
3 Regular performance and career development report 
4 Strategy formulation and decision making support to the top management 
5 Standardize training curriculum 
6 Market survey and feasibility report 
7 Database management 	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Islamic CG Dimensions 
Corporate Governance 
Mission 
1 The text of the board’s written mandate is described 
2 The bank has a clear statement of the leadership, purpose, mission and values with 
reference to corporate governance. 
3 The annual statement contains statement addressing corporate governance 
4 Reference is made to widely accept corporate governance principles 
5 Assessment is made regarding current compliance (where relevant) with the 
mentioned CG principles 
6 Clear statement of the stakeholders’ engagement on corporate governance issues 
and processes is provided. 
7 Communication policy for promoting effective communication with shareholders 
to encourage their participation is disclosed. 	  
Composition of the Board of Directors 
1 A leadership statement on how the board operates is disclosed 
2 Identity of the chairman is provided (such as independent or non-executive, etc.) 
3 Profile of chairman is disclosed (qualification and experience) 
4 Proportions of non-executive members or proportions of independent members are 
provided 
5 The identity of each director whether he/she is independent or non-executive is 
disclosed 
6 Profile of each board member is disclosed (qualification, experience etc.) 
7 Statement on whether or not the board and its committees are regularly assessed 
with respect to their effectiveness and contribution is provided 
8 If assessments are regularly conducted, the process used for the assessments is 
described or if assessments are not regularly conducted, statements on how the 
board satisfies itself (whether its members and committees are performing 
effectively) are described 
9 Reference to transparent and responsive process for evaluating performance of 
senior management is provided 	  
Board Leadership 
1 The Board member’s formally assigned individual’s responsibilities outside the 
bank are provided. 
2 The way the board delineates its role and responsibilities is described 
3 How the board facilitates its exercise of independent judgment in carrying out its 
responsibilities is disclosed 	  
Board Meetings 
1 The number or frequency of the meetings is disclosed 
2 Members’ attendance at meetings is disclosed 	  	  	  	  
38	  	  
Nomination Committee and/or Compensation Committee 
1 Committee size is disclosed 
2 Identity of the chairperson is disclosed whether he is independent or non-executive 
3 Profile of the chairperson is disclosed such as qualification, experience etc. 
4 Profile of each board member is disclosed 
5 Whether or not the board has a compensation committee composed entirely of 
independent directors is disclosed 
6 The proportion of independent members or non-executive members is disclosed 
7 The process by which the board identifies new candidates for board nomination is 
described 
8 The process by which the board determines the compensation for the bank’s 
directors and management is described 
9 If the board has standing committees other than the audit, compensation & 
nominating committees, the committees and their functions are disclosed 
10 Number of meetings held during the year is disclosed 
11 Attendance of each member’s committee meetings is disclosed 	  
Shari’ah Governance 
1 Statement on the endorsed conformity of Shari’ah compliance is disclosed 
2 Shari’ah supervisor structure is disclosed 
3 The board size is disclosed 
4 Identity of the chairman of the Shari’ah board is disclosed (experience, 
qualification etc.) 
5 The chairman of the Shari’ah board whether he is independent or non-executive 
chairperson is disclosed 
6 Whether other Shari’ah supervisory board members are independent or non-
executive are disclosed 
7 Qualification and relevant experience of all Shari’ah board are disclosed 
8 Formally assigned individual’s responsibilities of the board (outside the bank) are 
disclosed 
9 How the Shari’ah board facilitates its exercise of independent judgment in carrying 
out its responsibilities is disclosed 
10 Policies and procedures on appointment and dismissal of members are described 
11 Number of meetings during the year is disclosed 	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Shari’ah Compliance, Supports and Operations 
1 Mechanism on Shari’ah compliance monitoring is disclosed 
2 Treatment of all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah is provided 
3 Sources and uses of zakah and charity funds are disclosed 
4 Method of zakah calculation is disclosed 
5 The contractual rights of investment account holders are disclosed 
6 Investment and asset allocation strategies are provided 
7 Rights and liabilities of IAH in the event of liquidation are disclosed 
8 Statement on the mechanics of smoothing the returns by the bank is provided 
9 Notes related to the utilization of profit equalization ratio (PER) is provided 
10 Notes related to the utilization of investment risk reserves (IRR) is provided 
11 The treatment for the distribution of PER in the event of liquidation is disclosed 
12 The profit calculation method and its share of profit earned attributable to IAH are 
disclosed 
13 Changes to policy with regards to profit calculation is provided 
14 Changes to policy with regards to investment and asset allocation strategies is 
provided 
15 Change to policy with regards to smoothing of returns 
16 Legal right due to unrestricted IAH pertaining comingled funds is disclosed 
17 Legal right due to unrestricted IAH pertaining Mudharib’s failure is disclosed 
18 A report on appropriateness of Shari’ah basis of allocation of profit between equity 
holders and IAH is provided 	  
Ethical Business Conduct and Corporate Responsibility 
1 The code of ethics for the directors adopted by the board is disclosed 
2 If the board has adopted a written code, how a person or company may obtain a 
copy of the code is disclosed 
3 How the board monitors compliance with its code is disclosed OR if the board does 
not monitor compliance, how the board satisfies itself regarding compliance with 
its code is described 
4 Any steps the board takes to ensure directors exercise independent judgment in 
considering transactions and agreements in respect of which a director or executive 
management have a material interest are described 
5 Any other step the board takes to encourage and promote a culture of ethical 
business conduct is described 
6 Mechanism protecting the rights of shareholders is disclosed 
7 Policy and performance in connection with environmental and social responsibility 
is provided 
8 Waivers to the ethics code are disclosed 
9 Code of ethics for all employees is provided 
10 Role of employees in corporate governance is provided 
11 Performance evaluation process is disclosed 
12 Impact of environmental and social responsibility policies on bank’s sustainability 
is disclosed 
13 Policy on whistle blower protection for all employees is provided 	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Audit Committee 
1 Committee size is disclosed 
2 Identity of the chairperson is disclosed 
3 Whether the chairperson is independent or non-executive is disclosed 
4 Whether or not the board composed entirely of independent directors is disclosed 
5 Proportion of independent members is disclosed 
6 Whether committee members include non–executive director is disclosed 
7 The process by which the board identifies new candidates for board nomination is 
described 
8 The terms of reference of the committee is formed and approved by the board 
9 Scope of work and responsibilities is disclosed 
10 Term of reference of internal audit is disclosed 
11 Board’s confidence in independence and integrity of external auditors is provided 
12 Process of appointment of external auditor is disclosed 
13 Process for interaction with external auditor is disclosed 
14 Duration of current external auditors is disclosed 
15 Rotation of audit partners is disclosed 
16 Proportion of audit/other fees is disclosed 
17 Number of meetings held during the year is disclosed 
18 Attendance of each member’s committee meetings is disclosed 
19 The suitability of internal audit is provided (based on experience and qualification 
20 The internal audit is said to be conversant with policies and procedures of the bank 
21 The effectiveness of internal audit is stated 
22 Related party transactions are placed before audit committee and approved by the 
board. 
3.5.2.1 Defining the Construct of CSR and CG Index 
This section presents the construction of the CSR Index and the CG Index. Thus, in 
this section, all the dimensions listed in Table 3.2 are discussed.  
CSR Dimensions 
(i) Mission and Vision Statement 
The main objective of the mission and vision statement is to provide financial services 
in accordance with the Shari’ah laws and be able to put the Islamic principles into 
practice. According to Haniffa and Hudaib mission and vision statements in the 
annual reports are regarded as “the long and short-term commitments of business 
entity” (2004: 10). Ideally, most Islamic Banks analysed in this research provide 
social responsibility to develop the community and help customers and shareholders 
to understand their economic objectives.  
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(ii) BOD and Top Management 
The main objective of the BOD is to provide and build a trusting relationship between 
the agents (the managers) and the principals (the owners of the resources). According 
to Haniffa and Hudaib (2004: 106) Islamic banks ought to include more information 
and credentials about their BOD and top management in their annual reports in order 
for researchers, readers and users to be able to communicate and make their 
judgments accordingly. Hence, personal information such as their names, positions, 
pictures, shareholdings of members, academic qualifications, and meetings attended 
should be disclosed in the annual reports. This helps understand the profile of the 
BOD and top management of a business. 
(iii) Products and Services 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2004: 106) state that what differentiates Islamic banks from 
conventional ones are the type of services and products they offer. It is obligatory for 
Islamic banks to comply with Shari’ah laws and rules in all of their products and 
services. Hence, Islamic banks ought to deal in transparent manner to ensure that is it 
delivering accurate information regarding their products and services through their 
annual reports and, thus, users of the annual reports can judge the Islamic banks 
justly.  
Moreover, the BSM annual report states that: “All product features of funding, 
financing and operational services have won approval from SSB to assure of product 
compliance with the shari’ah principles” (2010: 14). Therefore, IFIs and Islamic 
banks when launching new products and services disclose that they seek SSB 
approval. Nevertheless, most Islamic banks do not provide information about their 
involvement in non-permissible activities but concentrate on their products and 
services, which are Shari’ah compliance and have been approved by the SBB. 
(iv) Zakah, Charity, Benevolent Loans 
Zakah, charity and benevolent loans are seen as part of the social welfare and 
development of Islamic banks and are obligatory under Islamic law and not just as an 
act of worshipping (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2004: 108). The act of zakah is seen as a part 
of the Islamic banks’ operations, hence, having a responsibility towards their 
42	  	  
shareholder and depositor this should be the banks main responsibility and not to be 
concerned with other social responsibility within the environment (Dusuki, 2007).  
Thus, the ADIB Annual Report states, “the management of the Bank is not authorized 
to pay Zakat directly, the responsibility of paying Zakat is that of the shareholders” 
(2002: 10). Other forms of strategic social development such as benevolent fund, 
charity, Zakah and other form of social development and life improvement of the less 
fortunate in society most importantly, the act of zakah charity as Asutay (2012: 93) 
states, “funds should be created with the objective of serving the social and 
developmental needs of Muslim societies”.  
Although, most Islamic banks disclosed in their annual reports the amount of zakah 
paid, none stated how the zakah was used. In addition, although payment of zakah is 
seen as a religious obligation, according to the ARB it can be seen as a tax burden:  
The Department of Zakat and Income (DZIT) zakat is calculated based on 
the zakat rules and regulations while any differences between the Bank’s 
calculation and the Department of zakat and Income Tax’s (DZIT) 
assessment, such differences will be charged to the general reserve (ARB, 
Annual Report, 2008: 37).  
It should be noted that other acts of contributing to the welfare of society and the 
improvement of the poor is under the dimension of qard-hasan, which further 
distinguishes Islamic banks from conventional banks. Qard-hasan are loans in which 
only the principle is repaid and is seen one of the most fundamental institutions 
though which Islamic society is provided with schools, hospitals, mosques and 
shelters (Abbasi, 2012: 122). Nonetheless, it has been argued that the information 
disclosed in the annual reports related to how and towards what these loans are issued 
is limited. Furthermore, IFIs and Islamic banks ought to have a “clear policy 
regarding non-repayment of such funds” (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2004: 108).  
(v) Commitment towards Employees 
This dimension indicates the importance of human capital from the social 
responsibility perspective. However, the information disclosed in the annual reports is 
not as efficient as it should be. Haniffa and Hudaib (2004: 108) state that not many 
Islamic banks disclose information on employee’s welfare, benefits, health insurance, 
training courses, etc. Specifically, training courses related to the Shari’ah banking 
practices to enhance employee awareness in relation to newly launched products and 
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services should be held and reported. Thus, employees should be able to convey an 
accurate message of the products and services to their customers and shareholders. 
Therefore, more information is expected to be disclosed in the annual reports 
regarding this particular dimension.  
(vi) Commitment towards debtors 
In this dimension, Islamic banks aim to discover if debtors are well informed in the 
annual reports. However, little information is provided in this dimension in terms of 
the banks’ debt policies. Thus, IFIs and Islamic banks ought to disclose more 
information on this dimension (Haniffa and Hudaib: 2007: 108-109). 
(vii) Commitment towards Community and Society 
This dimension seeks to measure the contribution towards the development of society 
and its people through the involvement of Islamic banks and IFIs in social activities. 
Information needs to be disclosed in the Islamic banks’ annual reports to fulfil their 
ethicality criteria. One bank, Masraf AlRayan of Qatar mentions its role within 
society as being:  
keen on participation in community development through supporting 
individuals and groups to carry out their role in building a better society. 
The Bank is also keen on taking part in public causes that concern the 
society, protect the environment, and encourage protection of natural 
resources, healthy practices, supports sports, and charitable endeavors 
(Masraf Al Rayan, Annual Report, 2011: 31). 
However, it has argued by Haniffa and Hudaib (2007: 109) that although Islamic 
banks view CSR as a vital part of its business, there is limited information disclosed 
in their annual reports. This is because Islamic banks aim not only to maximize their 
profits and adopt CSR in accordance with Shari’ah compliance but also as the ADIB 
Annual Report states “its participation in various community development programs 
makes a sincere effort at making the society a better place to live in” (2003: 18).  
(viii) Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
Under this dimension, Islamic banks are required to communicate information about 
their SSB. Haniffa and Hudaib (2007: 109) state that Islamic banks ought to include 
names, pictures, remuneration and reports signed by the SSB. The SBBs are supposed 
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to ensure that the management is conducting the business in accordance with Shari’ah 
compliance. Checking documents and procedures to ensure compliance with Shari’ah 
is a vital part of the functions of SSB. However, the authority of the SSBs is limited in 
some Islamic banks, as the International Islamic annual report confirms: 
The Committee confirms that the responsibility of applying the Shari’ah 
terms and conditions lies on the Bank’s management, whereas, our 
responsibility is limited to expressing our opinion and monitoring the 
transactions submitted within its guidelines (2009: 23).  
(ix) Environment 
This dimension examines if Islamic banks and IFIs communicate the expected 
information about their contribution towards environmental issues. In recent years, 
concerns about the environment have led to an increased awareness of the corporate 
environmental responsibility, and protecting the environment is now a vital part of 
CSR. Therefore, Islamic banks need to communicate information related to this 
dimension of their activities. Adams (2002) states that corporate environmental 
disclosure has led companies, banks and other financial institutions to expand their 
role in providing financial disclosure and environmental disclosure. In this context, 
the HLIB annual report states that: “Environmental management programs such as 
recycling campaigns, air pollution controls and waste management programs are 
continuously deployed” (2012:17). However, Islamic banks must include detailed 
information, such the size and scope of environmental activities, since, Islamic moral 
economy encourages and insist on being social responsible towards the environment.  
(x) Research and Development 
This dimension seeks to examine Islamic banks and IFIs communicate the expected 
information about their contribution towards research and development projects. 
However, Islamic banks do not provide much information in the area of research and 
development.  
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CG Dimensions  
The following is a description of each of the dimensions and the contents of the GC 
dimensions.  
(i) Mission 
The main objective of CG related to the mission statement of Islamic banks is to 
operate in accordance with the Shari’ah laws and principles in order to meet 
international ethics and morals. In this context, the QIB annual report states that the 
main aim is to be “a leading, innovative and global Islamic bank adhering to the 
highest Shari’ah and ethical principles; meeting international banking standards; 
partnering with the development of the global economy and participating in the 
advancement of the society” (2008: 5). Therefore, more information ought to be 
disclosed in Islamic banks’ annual reports. Information such as statements addressing 
CG, making a clear statement on the leadership, purpose, mission and values with 
reference to CG, making a clear statement of the stakeholders engagement on CG 
issues and the processes used.  
(ii) Composition of the Board of Directors (BOD) 
Under this dimension Islamic banks are required to communicate information about 
the BODs, including how the board operates and the proportion of non-executive 
members or independent members. According to Ariff and Iqbal (2011:117), board 
committees established by the BOD are a part of CG. These committees, which 
support rather than replace the BOD, are responsible for examining various aspects of 
the operations of Islamic banks. 
(iii) Board Leadership 
This dimension seeks the level of disclosed information about the board members, 
how their roles and responsibilities are defined and how they facilitate the exercise of 
independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Therefore, Islamic banks 
should disclose detailed information on the board leadership and their functions in 
their annual reports.  
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(iv) Board Meetings 
Under this dimension, the number of meetings held by the BOD and management and 
members’ attendance at the meetings should be disclosed.  
(v) Nomination Committee and/or Compensation Committee 
The main objective of reporting in the annual reports on the nomination committee 
and/or the compensation committee is to disclose information such as the committee 
size, the profile and educational qualification of the chairperson as well as his/her 
experience and other sub-dimensions. Ariff and Iqbal argue that the “nomination 
committee is seen as the most vital in its responsibilities for the board 
communications in terms of reviewing the board’s performance” (2011:117).   
(vi) Shari’ah Governance 
The Shari’ah governance dimension aims to ensure that all internal and external 
practices and operations meet the conditions of Shari’ah compliance. The SSB aims 
to ensure control and justice in financial transactions in order to increase people’s 
confidence in the IFIs with respect to compliance with Shari’ah principles.  
(vii) Shari’ah Compliance, Supports and Operations 
The main framework of CG in Islam is articulated in the ethical and moral concept of 
Shari’ah, shura and tawhid these concepts are seen as the bases of CG in Islam 
(Lewis, 2005: 19). Since CG model in Islam is mainly concerned about the equal 
protection of the stakeholder’s rights regardless if whether they own or hold shares or 
not rather than just protecting the interest of the shareholders. It is vital to further 
discusses the CG models from an Islamic perspective and observe how IFIs adopts 
these models in their operations. Thus, the Islamic banks should disclose the 
following information in their annual reports: the nature of the mechanism for dealing 
with Shari’ah, dealing with all earnings realized from sources prohibited by Shari’ah, 
and information related to the use of zakah and charity funds, what is their main 
source and how they are distributed.  
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(viii) Ethical Business Conduct and Corporate Responsibility 
Under this dimension, the Islamic banks and IFIs are expected to disclose information 
in their annual reports such as the code of ethics for the directors, how the board 
monitors compliance with its code, if the board does not monitor compliance and 
details of the protection of the shareholders, the performance in connection with 
environmental and CSR. 
(ix) Audit Committee 
The main dimension of the Audit Committee in CG in Islam is that certain 
information about the audit committee such as its size, the identity of the chairperson, 
the scope of work and responsibilities should be disclosed.  
3.5.3. Data Analysis Method and Process 
The data collected from the annual reports through content analysis were codified into 
quantitative data and subjected to descriptive data analysis in the form of mean 
analysis in order to identify the central position in terms of trends in the data for each 
dimension. The model adopted for this study is based that developed by Haniffa and 
Hudiab (2007).  
The coding score of each item is established through the content analysis; in the case 
of having been disclosed a score of 1 was given, if it is not disclosed then a score of 0 
is given. The overall dimensions are scored in an additive manner; Haniffa and 
Hudiab (2007: 103) demonstrate that the scoring of the index is additive, which 
means that it is based on equally weighted average. This helps to establish the scores 
for eight dimensions for CSR and nine dimensions for CG. The indices for both 
measures are constructed according to the following formula:  
𝐸𝐼𝐼! = !"#!"!!!!"  
Where EIIj = ethical identity index for dimension j and period t; 
Xij= variable X from 1 up to n for dimension j and period t; 
N= number of statements for dimension j. 
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In presenting the analysis of the results, each dimension in each index is calculated 
and presented at both the bank and country level. The results are presented in tables 
which display the individual scores in each year and the total score for the five years. 
Thus, the tables present the level of the CSR and CG performance of the 75 sampled 
Islamic banks from the five GCC countries. Thus, the tables display the result of each 
bank and country in order to identify the overall score for both CSR and CG.  
As for the interpretation of the results, as suggested by Haniffa and Hudiab, a high 
score for a dimension  
suggests that the corporation has adopted a communication strategy that fits 
its religious ethical identity [or the dimensions measured], while a low EII 
suggests the need to improve its communication strategy to enhance its 
ethical image and reputation and to gain competitive advantage [in the 
particular identified area] (2007: 104). 
However, it is important to emphasise the difficulties and limitations of precisely 
collecting information from annual reports from some of the newly established 
Islamic banks in the GCC countries. One of the difficulties is related to the lack of 
data for one of the GCC banks. In addition, the 2008 annual reports from two of the 
banks from Qatar, the International Islamic Bank and the Masraf Al-Rayan Bank and 
one bank from Saudi Arabia Alinma bank were missing. Hence, the coding in these 
cases was scored as ‘n/a’.  
The calculation method through the identified formula is applied to each individual 
bank and country, since the index of CSR and CG is constructed by adding up the 
scored located for each item under each dimension. The mean value provides the 
resultant score for each dimension of each bank in each year. The mean bank scores 
of a particular country provide the result for that particular country. In other words, on 
the country level, the CSR and CG index on the country level is derived by the total 
scores for each individual bank.  
3.6. CONCLUSION 
After defining, identifying and detailing the research methodology and procedure as 
well as the content of the index for CSR and CG dimensions, the next chapter, being 
the empirical chapter, details findings of the study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EVALUATING THE CSR AND CG DISCLOSURE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
GCC ISLAMIC BANKS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discusses the research methodology used to measure the CSR 
and CG disclosure performance in terms of the communicated information of the 
major 15 Islamic banks in the Gulf region through an examination of the ‘Ethicality 
Index for CSR’ and the ‘CG Disclosure Index’ in their annual reports. This chapter 
presents the analysis investigating the relationship between CG and CSR. In other 
words, the indices developed for the disclosure performance are used also to explain 
the correlation between CSR and CG and to explain how close the practices of the 
sampled Islamic banks are in terms of CSR and CG disclosure to best practices.   
The following sections first provide the CSR disclosure performance at bank and 
country level; and then the same is repeated for the CG disclosure performance. The 
results are also presented in terms of dimension scores. Finally, correlation results are 
presented with the objective of testing the hypothesis that CG leads the CSR.  
4.2. MEASURING THE CSR DISCLOSURE PERFORMANCE OF ISLAMIC 
BANKS IN THE GCC REGION: BANK AND COUNTRY LEVEL 
This section provides the analysis and results for the CSR Index dimensions at bank 
and country level over the period in question. 
4.2.1. Disclosure on ‘Mission and Vision Statement’ Dimension 
The main objective of the mission and vision statement dimension as part of the CSR 
Ethical Identity Index is for the Islamic banks to be able to provide financial services 
in accordance with the Shari’ah laws and be able to put the Islamic principles into 
practice. According to Haniffa and Hudaib (2004:10) ‘mission and vision’ in the 
annual reports are regarded as “the long and short-term commitments of business 
entity”.  
The results of the content analysis of mission and vision dimension as the mean value 
of ‘sub-dimensions’ under this dimension is depicted in Table 4.1 at the bank level. 
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The EIB of UAE scored the highest with full disclosure of 1.00, followed by ADI of 
UAE with the score of 0.87, then the Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain 0.80, QIB of Qatar 
0.74 and KFH of Kuwait 0.62. The lowest scores in communicating information in 
their annual reports related to mission and vision were attributed to DIB of UAE with 
0.13, ABC of Bahrain with 0.11 and KIB of Kuwait with 0.0. In addition, the results 
for the mission and vision dimension illustrated in the table 4.1 show that the overall 
mean is 0.47, which fell short of the best practice (best practice being 1). 
Table 4.1: Results of ‘Mission and Vision’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.57 KFH 0.62 QIB 0.74 
AlRajh
i 0.28 DIB 0.13 
Al 
Barak
a 0.80 KIB 0.02 IIB 0.57 
AlJazir
a 0.25 ADI 0.87 
ABC 0.11 
Boubya
n 0.14 MR 0.57 Alinma 0.45 EIB 1.00 
Mean = 0.47 
As presented in table 4.1, ABC of Bahrain and KIB of Kuwait of scored the lowest in 
communicating information in their annual reports under the vision and mission 
dimension. Nevertheless, various banks such as ADI bank made general statements 
under their mission and vision dimension that the mission of ADI bank is “to provide 
Islamic financial solutions for the global community” (Annual Report, 2009: 4), 
instead of stating clearly their compliance with Shari’ah principles in detail.  
Table 4.2: Results of ‘Mission and Vision’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Mission and Vision 
Bahrain 0.495 
Kuwait 0.266 
Qatar 0.628 
Saudi Arabia 0.333 
UAE 0.802 
Mean= 0.47 
 
The results at the country level for ‘mission and vision’ dimension are presented in 
table 4.2. As can be seen, the UAE Islamic banking industry scored the highest mean 
disclosure index with 0.802; this is followed by Qatar with 0.628, Bahrain with 0.495, 
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Saudi Arabia with 0.333 and finally Kuwait with 0.266. Thus, overall, the country 
level mean is 0.47 for ‘mission and vision’ dimension, which is still fall short of the 
best practice level. 
4.3.2. CSR Disclosure on ‘BOD’ Dimension 
The next dimension covered is ‘board of directors’, which primarily focuses on 
information disclosure about the BOD in building a trustworthy relationship between 
the management and their shareholders. Such communicated information includes 
personal information such as their names, positions, pictures, shareholdings of 
members and academic qualifications. The results are reported in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Results of ‘Board of Directors’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.64 KFH 0.50 QIB 0.55 
AlRajh
i 0.26 DIB 0.13 
Al 
Barak
a 0.79 KIB 0.20 IIB 0.18 
AlJazir
a 0.43 ADI 0.44 
ABC 0.70 
Boubya
n 0.40 MR 0.29 Alinma 0.21 EIB 0.35 
Mean = 0.40 
The analysis show that the majority of the sampled Islamic banks show the pictures of 
their BOD members, their names and positions but only three presented their 
academic qualifications and the number of the meeting held. However, none gave the 
shareholdings of board members, the multiple-directorships held by board members 
and the dual role of CEO and Chairman of Board.  
As it can be seen in table 4.3, Al-Baraka Bank of Bahrain scored the highest 
disclosure with 0.79, followed by ABC of Bahrain with 0.70, and Ithmar Bank of 
Bahrain 0.64. QIB of Qatar with 0.55 followed by KFH of Kuwait with 0.50, ADI 
bank of UAE with 0.44, AlJazita bank of Saudi Arabia with 0.43, EIB of UAE with 
0.35, followed by MR of Qatar with 0.29. The lowest scores in communicating 
information in their annual reports related to the BOD are attributed to AlRajhi bank 
of Saudi Arabia with 0.26, followed by KIB of Kuwait with 0.20, IIB of Qatar at 0.18, 
and DIB of UAE with 0.13. Moreover, the results for the bank level disclosure for the 
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BOD dimension show an overall mean of 0.40.  
Table 4.4: Results of ‘BOD’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country BOD 
Bahrain 0.707 
Kuwait 0.369 
Qatar 0.343 
Saudi Arabia 0.302 
UAE 0.312 
Mean = 0.40 
As presented in table 4.4, the Bahraini Islamic banking industry scored the highest 
mean disclosure index with 0.707; this is followed by Kuwait with 0.369, Qatar with 
0.343, Saudi Arabia with 0.302 and UAE 0.312. The country level mean is 0.40 for 
‘BOD’ dimension in the case of sampled banks.  
The results imply that the limited information is disclosed in the annual reports about 
the BOD, which undermines the ability of customers and shareholders to judge and 
trust those who are operating the businesses on their behalf (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2004: 11). If basic information such as the BOD academic qualifications and profile is 
not disclosed, it raises the question as to how shareholders and customers can know if 
the business is operating according to Shari’ah principles.  
4.3.3. Disclosure on ‘Products and Services’ Dimension 
The results in relation to ‘Products and Services’ for the CSR Index focuses on what 
differentiate Islamic banks from conventional ones, the type of services and products 
offered. Since it is obligatory for Islamic banks to comply with Shari’ah laws and 
rules in all of their products and services, Islamic banks should observe a certain level 
of distinction. 
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Table 4.5: Results of ‘Products and Services’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.44 KFH 0.48 QIB 0.46 
AlRajh
i 0.50 DIB 0.14 
Al 
Barak
a 0.56 KIB 0.14 IIB 0.26 
AlJazir
a 0.36 ADI 0.46 
ABC 0.32 
Boubya
n 0.28 MR 0.48 Alinma 0.30 EIB 0.58 
Mean = 0.38 
The results as presented in table 4.5 show that the EIB of UAE scored the highest 
disclosure with 0.58, followed by Al-Baraka Bank of Bahrain 0.56, followed by 
AlRajhi bank of Saudi Arabia with 0.50, and KFH of Kuwait and MR of Qatar with 
0.48 each, followed by QIB of Qatar with 0.46. The lowest scores in this dimension 
are attributed to Boubyan Bank of Kuwait, which scored 0.28, followed by IIB of 
Qatar with 0.26 and DIB of UAE and KIB of Kuwait with 0.14 each. The overall 
bank level mean is 0.38 for the ‘products and services dimension’ for the sampled 
banks.  
Table 4.6: Results of ‘Products and Services’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Products and Services 
Bahrain 0.440 
Kuwait 0.300 
Qatar 0.400 
Saudi Arabia 0.386 
UAE 0.393 
Mean = 0.38 
The country level results for this dimension are presented in table 4.6. The results 
highlight that Bahraini banks at 0.440 achieved the best score. This is followed by 
Qatar at 0.400, the UAE 0.393, Saudi Arabia 0.386 and finally Kuwait with the lowest 
score of 0.300. The country level mean is 0.38 for ‘products and services’ dimension 
indicating a weak score of disclosure performance. 
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4.3.4. Disclosure on ‘Zakah, Charity, Benevolent Funds and Other Strategic 
Social Development’ Dimension 
The main objective of the zakah, charity and benevolent loans by Islamic banks is to 
improve social welfare and development. These are obligatory under Islamic law 
since the act of zakah is considered to part of the act of worshipping (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2004: 108) as enunciated by the Islamic moral economy. 
Table 4.7: Results of ‘Zakah, Charity, Benevolent Funds and Other Strategic 
Social Development’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.16 KFH 0.06 QIB 0.29 
AlRajh
i 0.21 DIB 0.14 
Al 
Barak
a 0.29 KIB 0.02 IIB 0.00 
AlJazir
a 0.14 ADI 0.44 
ABC 0.00 
Boubya
n 0.01 MR 0.12 Alinma 0.08 EIB 0.41 
Mean = 0.15 
The results for this dimension on the bank level, as presented in table 4.7, show that 
ADI bank of UAE scored the highest score with 0.44, followed by EIB bank of UAE 
0.41, and Al Baraka bank of Bahrain and QIB of Qatar with 0.29 each, Al Rajhi Bank 
of Saudi Arabia 0.21, Ithmar Bank of Bahrain 0.16, and AlJazira of Saudi Arabia and 
DIB of UAE with 0.14 each. Extremely low scores are attributed to KIB of Kuwait 
with 0.02, followed by the Boubyan Bank of Kuwait with score of 0.01, ABC Bank of 
Bahrain and IIB of Qatar both scored zero. The overall mean is only 0.15, which is far 
below the acceptable level.   
Table 4.8: Results of ‘Zakah, Charity, Benevolent Funds and Other Strategic 
Social Development’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Zakah, Charity 
Bahrain 0.151 
Kuwait 0.035 
Qatar 0.137 
Saudi Arabia 0.146 
UAE 0.333 
Mean = 0.15 
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The results at the country level for the ‘zakah, charity and benevolent loans’ displayed 
in table 4.8 show that UAE Islamic banks industry scored the highest mean disclosure 
index with 0.333; this is followed by Bahrain with 0.151, Saudi Arabia with 0.146, 
Qatar with 0.137 and Kuwait with the lowest at 0.035. The country level mean is 0.15 
for the ‘zakah, charity and benevolent loans’ dimension indicating a very low 
disclosure in this dimension. 
4.3.5. Disclosure Results on ‘Commitment towards Employees’ Dimension 
Table 4.9: Results of ‘Commitment towards Employees’ Dimension at the Bank 
Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.71 KFH 0.11 QIB 0.42 
AlRajh
i 0.00 DIB 0.17 
Al 
Barak
a 0.48 KIB 0.04 IIB 0.11 
AlJazir
a 0.20 ADI 0.46 
ABC 0.17 
Boubya
n 0.15 MR 0.40 Alinma 0.24 EIB 0.26 
Mean = 0.26 
This dimension indicates the necessity of human capital, as it is a vital part for the 
robust development and social responsibility of Islamic banks. In their attempt to 
measure this dimension, Haniffa and Hudaib (2004: 108) found that not many Islamic 
banks disclosed information on employees’ welfare, their benefits, health insurance, 
training courses for their development, etc. In line with this, the results of this 
research also indicate that not most Islamic banks fail to communicate sufficient 
information about their employees.  
As is illustrated from the ethical identity index in table 4.9, Ithmar Bank of Bahrain 
scored the highest 0.71, which is followed by Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain 0.48, ADI 
Bank of UAE 0.46, QIB of Qatar 0.42 and MR bank of Qatar with 0.40. At the 
opposite end of disclosure are ABC Bank of Bahrain and DIB of UAE both scoring 
0.17, Boubyan Bank of Bahrain with 0.15, KFH of Kuwait and IIB of Qatar with 0.11 
each followed by KIB of Kuwait with 0.04. The lowest score is scored by AlRajhi 
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Bank of Saudi Arabia, which scored zero. The overall mean at the bank level is 0.26 
for the ‘commitments towards employees’ dimension.  
Table 4.10: Results of ‘Commitment towards Employees’ Dimension at the 
Country Level 
Country Commitment towards Employees 
Bahrain 0.459 
Qatar  0.311  
UAE  0.303  
Saudi Arabia 0.148 
Kuwait  0.103  
Mean=0.26 
The results in country level for the ‘commitment towards employees’ dimension are 
presented in table 4.10. As can be seen, Bahrain Islamic banking industry scored the 
highest mean disclosure index with 0.459; this is followed by Qatar with 0.311, UAE 
with 0.303, Saudi Arabia with 0.148 and Kuwait with 0.103. The overall country level 
mean for the ‘commitment towards employees’ dimension is 0.26.  
4.3.6. Disclosure Results on ‘Commitment towards Employees’ Dimension 
This dimension aims to discover if commitment to debtors is well communicated in 
the annual reports. The results, which are depicted in table 4.11, highlight the ABC 
Bank of Bahrain scored the highest with 0.75, followed by Ithmar Bank of Bahrain 
with 0.58, AlJazira Bank of Saudi Arabia with 0.55, EIB Bank of UAE 0.5, AlRajhi 
Bank of Saudi Arabia 0.45, and Alinma Bank of Saudi Arabia 0.4. Those banks, 
which scored poorly, were Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain and ADI Bank of UAE both 
with 0.35, MR Bank of Qatar 0.25, and DIB Bank of UAE 0.1. However, the three 
main Islamic banks of Kuwait, KFH, KIB and Boubyan all scored zero, as did the IIB 
of Qatar. The overall bank level mean score is 0.29. Thus, IFIs and IBs ought to 
disclose more information on this dimension (Haniffa and Hudaib: 2007: 108-109). 
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Table 4.11: Results of ‘Commitment towards Debtors’ Dimension at the Bank 
Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.58 KFH 0.00 QIB 0.10 
AlRajh
i 0.45 DIB 0.10 
Al 
Barak
a 0.35 KIB 0.00 IIB 0.00 
AlJazir
a 0.55 ADI 0.35 
ABC 0.75 
Boubya
n 0.00 MR 0.25 Alinma 0.40 EIB 0.50 
Mean = 0.29 
Table 4.12: Results on ‘Commitment towards Debtors’ Dimension at the 
Country Level 
Country Commitment towards Debtors 
Bahrain 0.650 
Kuwait 0.000 
Qatar 0.116 
Saudi Arabia 0.466 
UAE 0.316 
Mean = 0.29 
The results at the country level for the ‘Commitments towards Debtors’ dimension, 
are displayed in Table 4.12. The Bahrain Islamic banking sector scored the highest 
mean discourse index with 0.650, followed by Saudi Arabia with 0.466, wand then 
UAE 0.316 and Qatar 0.116. However, Kuwait recorded a zero score. The country 
level mean is 0.30 for the ‘commitments towards debtors’ index implying that for this 
dimension also the performance is far from best practice. 
4.3.7. Disclosure Results on ‘Commitment towards Community’ Dimension 
The dimension of ‘commitment towards community’ aims to measure as to how much 
the sampled banks are contributing towards the development of society and people 
within the larger social environment in which they operate. The involvement of 
Islamic banks in social activities is deemed a necessity to maintain their corporate 
ethical identity.  
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Table 4.13: Results of ‘Commitment towards Community’ Dimension at the 
Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.60 KFH 0.57 QIB 0.50 
AlRajh
i 0.70 DIB 0.34 
Al 
Barak
a 0.71 KIB 0.14 IIB 0.25 
AlJazir
a 0.45 ADI 0.77 
ABC 0.26 
Boubya
n 0.57 MR 0.40 Alinma 0.00 EIB 0.31 
Mean = 0.43 
As can be seen from Table 4.13, ADI Bank of UAE recorded the highest score with 
0.77, followed by Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain with 0.71, AlRajihi Bank of Saudi 
Arabia with 0.70, Ithmar Bank of Bahrain with 0.60, and KFH and Boubyan Bank of 
Kuwait both with scores of 0.57 and QIB of Qatar with score of 0.50. The lowest 
scoring banks were DIB of UAE with 0.34 followed by EIB of UAE with 0.31, ABC 
bank of Bahrain with 0.26, IIB of Qatar with 0.25, KIB of Kuwait with 0.14, and the 
lowest score was attributed to Alinma Bank of Saudi Arabia with zero. The overall 
mean of the ‘Commitment towards Community’ dimension at the bank level is only 
0.43 indicating that even the half of the information expected to be communicated is 
not disclosed by the sampled Islamic banks.  
Table 4.14: Results of ‘Commitment towards Community’ Dimension at the 
Country Level 
Country Commitment towards Community 
Bahrain 0.447 
Kuwait 0.428 
Qatar 0.358 
Saudi Arabia 0.385 
UAE 0.476 
Mean = 0.43 
The results at the country level for the ‘Commitments towards Community’ 
dimension can be seen in Table 4.14. The UAE Islamic banks industry scored the 
highest mean discourse index with 0.476, followed by Bahrain with 0.447, Kuwait 
with 0.428, Saudi Arabia with 0.385, and finally Qatar with a score of 0.358. Overall, 
59	  	  
the country level mean was 0.43 implying that less than half of the information 
needed for full disclosure is disclosed. 
4.3.8. Disclosure Results on ‘Shari’ah Supervisory Board’ Dimension 
Under this dimension Islamic banks are required to communicate information about 
their SSB. Haniffa and Hudaib (2007: 109) argue this information should include the 
names, pictures and remuneration of members plus the reports signed by the SSB.  
Table 4.15: Results of ‘Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB)’ Dimension at the 
Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ban
k 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ban
k 
Inde
x 
Ithmar 0.23 KFH 0.25 QIB 0.27 AlRajhi 0.18 DIB 0.10 
Al 
Baraka 0.30 KIB 0.19 IIB 0.21 AlJazira 0.25 ADI 0.41 
ABC 0.00 Boubyan 0.23 MR 0.29 Alinma 0.18 EIB 0.27 
Mean = 0.22 
The results of the ‘Shari’ah Supervisory Board’ dimension, which are depicted in 
Table 4.15, show that the ADI Bank of UAE scored the highest score with 0.41, 
followed by Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain with 0.30, MR of Qatar with 0.29, and then 
by QIB of Qatar and EIB of UAE which both scored 0.27, followed by IIB of Qatar 
with 0.21. The lowest ranking banks were KIB of Kuwait with 0.19, Alinma and 
AlRajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia both with 0.18, DIB of the UAE with 0.10 and ABC 
Bank of Bahrain with zero. The overall mean of the SSB index is 0.22, which 
indicates a very low disclosure.  
Table 4.16: Results of ‘Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB)’ Dimension at the 
Country Level 
Country SSB 
Bahrain 0.181 
Kuwait 0.200 
Qatar 0.260 
Saudi Arabia 0.206 
UAE 0.266 
Mean = 0.22 
60	  	  
The country level results for the ‘Shari’ah Supervisory Board’ dimension presented in 
table 4.16 show that the UAE Islamic banking sector scored the highest mean 
disclosure index with 0.266, followed by Qatar with 0.260, Saudi Arabia with 0.206, 
Kuwait with 0.200 and Bahrain with 0.181. The country level mean is 0.22 for the 
SSB score, indicating a very low level of disclosure. 
4.3.9. Disclosure Results on ‘Environment’ Dimension 
The results of the content analysis according to the CSR Index’s ‘Environment’ 
dimension at the bank level are presented in table 4.17.  
Table 4.17: Results of ‘Environment’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.25 KFH 0.07 QIB 0.02 
AlRajh
i 0.00 DIB 0.07 
Al 
Barak
a 0.05 KIB 0.00 IIB 0.00 
AlJazir
a 0.00 ADI 0.07 
ABC 0.00 
Boubya
n 0.00 MR 0.02 Alinma 0.00 EIB 0.00 
Mean = 0.03 
According to the results in Table 4.17, Ithmar bank of Bahrain scored the highest with 
score of only 0.25, followed by ADI and DIB of UAE and KFH of Kuwait, all with a 
score of 0.07 and Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain with 0.05. Eight banks failed to disclose 
any information and therefore were scores at zero; these are ABC of Bahrain, KIB 
and Boubyan bank of Kuwait, IIB of Qatar, EIB of UAE and the three Saudi banks, 
AlRajhi, AlJazira and Alinma. The bank level mean is 0.03 for the Environment 
score, indicating a very low level of disclosure.  
Table 4.18: Results of ‘Environment’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Environment 
Bahrain 0.091 
Kuwait 0.025 
Qatar 0.016 
Saudi Arabia 0.000 
UAE 0.050 
Mean = 0.03 
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The country level results for the ‘Environment’ dimension are depicted in Table 4.18. 
These show that Bahraini Islamic banking sector scored the highest mean score with 
only 0.091, followed by UAE with 0.050, Kuwait with 0.025, Qatar with 0.016, and at 
the bottom Saudi Arabia with zero. The overall the country level mean score is 0.03 
indicating that the GCC Islamic banks disclose very little about environmental issues, 
despite the environment being considered as amanah (in trust from God).  
4.3.10 Disclosure Results on ‘Research and Development’ Dimension 
The results of the content analysis according to the CSR Index’s ‘Research and 
Development’ dimension at the bank level are presented in table 4.19.  
Table 4.19: Results of ‘Research and Development’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.05 KFH 0.02 QIB 0.03 
AlRajh
i 0.02 DIB 0.00 
Al 
Barak
a 0.02 KIB 0.00 IIB 0.10 
AlJazir
a 0.00 ADI 0.11 
ABC 0.00 
Boubya
n 0.05 MR 0.03 Alinma 0.00 EIB 0.00 
Mean = 0.03 
The results for the ‘research and development’ dimension at the bank level are 
presented in table 4.19. The ADI Bank of UAE scored the highest with a score of only 
0.11, followed by IIB of Qatar with 0.10, and Ithmar of Bahrain with 0.05. Six banks 
failed to disclose any information and therefore scored zero. These banks were ABC 
of Bahrain, KIB of Kuwait, AlJazira Bank and Alinma Bank of Saudi Arabia and DIB 
and EIB of UAE.  
Given the very low disclosure of the sampled banks for this dimension, the overall 
mean is only 0.03, indicating that virtually no information is provided by the GCC 
Islamic banks for this dimension. 
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Table 4.20: Results of ‘Research and Development’ Dimension at the Country 
Level 
Country Research and Development 
Bahrain 0.028 
Kuwait 0.028 
Qatar 0.055 
Saudi Arabia 0.009 
UAE 0.038 
Mean = 0.03 
The country level results for the ‘research and development’ dimension can be seen in 
Table 4.20. The Qatari Islamic banking industry scored the highest mean disclosure 
index with 0.055, followed by UAE with 0.038, Kuwait and Bahrain with 0.028 and 
Saudi Arabia (0.009). The country level mean is a very weak 0.03 for the CSR index 
for the ‘research and development’ dimension. 
4.3.11 Overall Results for ‘CSR Disclosure Performance’ Dimension 
The previous sections present the results at the bank and country level for each 
dimension of the CSR index. This section discusses the overall results for the CSR 
disclosure of the main Islamic banks in the GCC region. The overall results are 
calculated as the average of the mean values scored by each of the dimensions. The 
ranked results from highest to lowest are presented in Table 4.21. 
Table 4.21: Overall CSR Disclosure Results at the Bank Level  
Ranking Name of Bank Country of Origin 
 
Overall Score for 
CSR Disclosure 
1 ADI UAE 0.438 
2 AlBaraka Bahrain 0.435 
3 Ithmar Bahrain 0.420 
4 EIB UAE 0.368 
5 QIB Qatar 0.338 
6 MR Qatar 0.285 
7 KFH Kuwait 0.268 
8 AlJazira Saudi Arabia 0.263 
9 AlRajhi Saudi Arabia 0.260 
10 ABC Bahrain 0.207 
11 Alinma Saudi Arabia 0.186 
12 Boubyan Kuwait 0.183 
13 IIB Qatar 0.168 
14 DIB UAE 0.132 
15 KIB Kuwait 0.075 
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Table 4.21 shows that the bank with the highest score was ADI bank of UAE with a 
score of 0.438. The lowest performance of CSR disclosure and practices was KIB of 
Kuwait, which scored an overall score of 0.075.  
Table 4.22: Country Level CSR Disclosure Index for all the Dimensions  
Country CSR Disclosure 
Bahrain 0.364 
UAE 0.328 
Qatar 0.262 
Saudi Arabia 0.238 
Kuwait 0.175 
Table 4.22 presents the overall CSR disclosure index scores in terms of dimension at 
the country level. The best performer of CSR practices from the sampled GCC 
countries is Bahrain with a score of 0.364, followed by the UAE with 0.328, Qatar 
with 0.262, Saudi Arabia with 0.238. Bahrain scored the highest, as it is obliged by 
the AAOIFI governance standards, namely ‘CSR conduct and disclosure for Islamic 
financial institutions’, which requires subscribed Islamic banks to disclose their CSR 
practices. As can be seen, Kuwait scored the lowest with a score of 0.175. 
Table 4.23: Dimension Level CSR Score Ranking  
CSR Disclosure 
Index Dimensions 
CSR Disclosure Index 
Score 
Mission and Vision 0.470 
Community 0.422 
BOD 0.404 
PRD & SER 0.384 
Debtors  0.312 
Employees 0.261 
SSB 0.224 
Zakah 0.158 
Environment 0.034 
R&D 0.028 
Table 4.23 highlights the ranking for each dimension in terms of disclosure. The best 
performing dimension is ‘mission and vision’ with 0.47 implying that 47% of the 
expected information is communicated. In contrast, research and development 
dimension only scored 0.028; thus only 2.8% of the expected information is disclosed. 
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4.4. MEASURING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DISCLOSURE 
PERFORMANCE OF ISLAMIC BANKS IN THE GCC: FINDINGS ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX DIMENSIONS AT THE BANK AND 
COUNTRY LEVEL 
After presenting the disclosure performance of CSR dimensions for the GCC Islamic 
banks, this section presents the disclosure performance results for each dimension 
under the CG disclosure index at the bank and country levels, as well as overall 
performance. 
4.4.1 Disclosure Results on ‘Mission and Vision’ Dimension  
The results for the ‘mission and vision’ dimension are shown in Table 4.24. The EIB 
of UAE scored the highest with full disclosure of 1, followed by ADI of UAE with a 
score of 0.87, Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain (0.80), QIB of Qatar (0.74), and KFH of 
Kuwait (0.62). The lowest scores in this dimension are attributed to KIB of Kuwait 
with 0.02, ABC of Bahrain with 0.11 and DIB of UAE with 0.13. The overall mean 
for the dimension is 0.50, which falls short of best practice. 
Table 4.24: Results of ‘Mission and Vision’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.57 KFH 0.62 QIB 0.74 
AlRajh
i 0.28 DIB 0.13 
Al 
Barak
a 0.80 KIB 0.02 IIB 0.57 
AlJazir
a 0.25 ADI 0.87 
ABC 0.11 
Boubya
n 0.14 MR 0.57 Alinma 0.45 EIB 1.00 
Mean = 0.50 
An example of the failure to meet the levels of compliance necessary is given by the 
ADI bank. The bank makes a general statement that its mission is “to provide Islamic 
financial solutions for the global community” (ADI Annual Report, ADI bank, 2009: 
4) rather than stating in detail their compliance with Shari’ah principles.  
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Table 4.25: Results of ‘Mission and Vision’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Mission and Vision 
Bahrain 0.495 
Kuwait 0.266 
Qatar 0.628 
Saudi Arabia 0.333 
UAE 0.802 
Mean = 0.50 
The country level results for the dimension of mission and vision is presented in table 
4.25. This shows that the UAE Islamic banks industry scored the highest mean 
disclosure index with 0.802; this is followed by Qatar with 0.628, Bahrain with 0.495, 
Saudi Arabia with 0.333 and Kuwait with 0.266. The overall mean for the Mission 
and Vision at the country level is 0.50.  
4.4.2. Disclosure Results on ‘Composition of the Board of Directors’ Dimension 
The results of the content analysis according to the CG Index’s ‘Composition of the 
Board of Directors’ at the bank level are presented in table 4.26. The table highlights 
that ABC of Bahrain scored the highest disclosure with 0.42, followed by Ithmar of 
Bahrain with 0.37, Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain with 0.31, followed by QIB of Qatar 
with 0.20. The other banks scored weakly with the poorest performers being KFH and 
KIB of Kuwait, AlRajhi and AlJazira bank of Saudi Arabia and ADI and EIB of UAE 
all of which scored zero. 
Table 4.26: Results of ‘Composition of the Board of Directors’ Dimension at the 
Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.37 KFH 0.00 QIB 0.20 
AlRajh
i 0.00 DIB 0.02 
Al 
Barak
a 0.31 KIB 0.00 IIB 0.02 
AlJazir
a 0.00 ADI 0.00 
ABC 0.42 
Boubya
n 0.15 MR 0.08 Alinma 0.02 EIB 0.00 
Mean = 0.10 
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The overall mean of the CG index of ‘composition of the Board of Directors’ 
dimension at the bank level is 0.10, implying that only 10% of the expected 
information is communicated by the sampled Islamic banks on this particular 
dimension. 
Table 4.27: Disclosure of ‘Composition of the Board of Directors’ Dimension at 
the Country Level 
Country 
Composition of the 
Board of Directors 
Bahrain 0.372 
Kuwait 0.050 
Qatar 0.103 
Saudi Arabia 0.007 
UAE 0.007 
Mean = 0.107 
The results at the country level for the ‘Composition of the Board of Directors’ 
dimension can be seen in Table 4.27. Bahrain Islamic banks scored the highest mean 
disclosure index with 0.372, followed by Qatar with 0.103, Kuwait with 0.050, and 
Saudi Arabia and UAE both scoring 0.007. The low disclosure mean of 0.107 is an 
indication of poor CG practices. 
4.4.3. Disclosure Results on ‘Board Leadership’ Dimension 
The results of the content analysis according to the CG Index’s ‘Board leadership’ at 
the bank level are presented in table 4.28 and at the country level in table 4.29. 
Table 4.28: Results of ‘Board Leadership’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.00 KFH 0.00 QIB 0.00 
AlRajh
i 0.00 DIB 0.00 
Al 
Barak
a 0.00 KIB 0.00 IIB 0.00 
AlJazir
a 0.00 ADI 0.00 
ABC 0.00 
Boubya
n 0.00 MR 0.00 Alinma 0.00 EIB 0.00 
Mean = 0 
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As the results shows none of the sampled banks reported or communicated any 
information for this dimension; as a result they all scored zero. Therefore, the country 
level results also scored zero. This should be considered an important failure for the 
sampled banks in terms of disclosure. 
Table 4.29: Results of ‘Board Leadership’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country 
Board 
Leadership 
Bahrain 0.00 
Kuwait 0.00 
Qatar 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 0.00 
UAE 0.00 
Mean = 0 
4.4.4. Disclosure Results on ‘Board Meeting’ Dimension 
The results of the content analysis for the ‘Board Meetings’ of the CG Index at the 
bank level presented in table 4.29, AlRajhi Bank of Saudi Arabia, and ADI and EIB 
banks of UAE all scored the maximum possible of 1. They are followed by Ithmar 
Bank and Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain, QIB and MR Bank of Qatar and AlJazira Bank 
of Saudi Arabia all with a high score of 0.80. Boubyan Bank of Kuwait and Alinma 
Bank of Saudi Arabia both scored 0.60. Only IIB of Qatar with a score of 0.2, and 
ABC Bank of Bahrain with zero performed very poorly. 
Table 4.30: Results of ‘Board Meetings’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.80 KFH 0.40 QIB 0.80 
AlRajh
i 1.00 DIB 0.40 
Al 
Barak
a 0.80 KIB 0.40 IIB 0.20 
AlJazir
a 0.80 ADI 1.00 
ABC 0.00 
Boubya
n 0.60 MR 0.80 Alinma 0.60 EIB 1.00 
Mean = 0.64 
The overall mean result at the bank level is 0.64, indicating a medium level of 
disclosure. 
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Table 4.31: Results of ‘Board Meetings’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Board Meetings 
Bahrain 0.533 
Kuwait 0.466 
Qatar 0.600 
Saudi Arabia 0.800 
UAE 0.800 
Mean = 0.64 
The results at the country level for the ‘Board Meetings’ dimension can be seen in 
table 4.30. UAE and Saudi Arabia Islamic banks industry according to the sampled 
banks scored the highest mean disclosure score with 0.8, followed by Qatar with 
0.600, Bahrain with 0.533 and Kuwait with 0.466. The overall mean of the Board 
Meeting dimension at the country level is 0.64 
4.4.5. Disclosure Results on ‘Nomination Committee and/or Compensation 
Committee’ Dimension 
The results of the content analysis for the ‘Nomination Committee or/and 
Compensation Committee’ at the bank level is presented in Table 4.31. AIthmar Bank 
and Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain both scored the highest with 0.41, followed by QIB of 
Qatar with 0.30 and ABC of Bahrain with score of 0.27. The poorest performing 
banks were DIB of UAE with 0.09, followed by KFH and KIB of Kuwait both with 
scores of 0.08, and IIB of Qatar with 0.03. 
Table 4.32: Results on ‘Nomination Committee and/or Compensation 
Committee’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.41 KFH 0.08 QIB 0.30 
AlRajh
i 0.18 DIB 0.09 
Al 
Barak
a 0.41 KIB 0.08 IIB 0.03 
AlJazir
a 0.14 ADI 0.18 
ABC 0.27 
Boubya
n 0.18 MR 0.20 Alinma 0.10 EIB 0.18 
Mean = 0.17 
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The overall mean of the ‘Nomination Committee and/or Compensation Committee’ 
index score at the bank level is 0.17, which indicates a very weak performance in 
terms of the disclosure of the expected information. 
Table 4.33: Results of ‘Nomination Committee and/or Compensation 
Committee’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country 
Nomination Committee and/or 
Compensation Committee 
Bahrain 0.369 
Kuwait 0.113 
Qatar 0.181 
Saudi Arabia 0.145 
UAE 0.090 
Mean = 0.17 
The results at country level can be seen in Table 4.33. Bahrain Islamic banking sector 
scored the highest with 0.369, followed by Qatar with 0.181, Saudi Arabia with 0.145, 
Kuwait with 0.113, and the UAE with the lowest score of 0.090. The overall score of 
the country level is 0.18.  
4.4.6. Disclosure Results on ‘Shari’ah Governance’ Dimension 
The results of the disclosure analysis for the ‘Shari’ah Governance’ under the CG 
Index at the bank level are depicted at Table 4.33. Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain scored 
the highest with 0.30, followed by Boubyan of Kuwait with 0.25, Ithmar Bank of 
Bahrain with 0.23 and KFH of Kuwait and QIB of Qatar both with 0.18. The other 
banks performed even more badly, with the worst performers being Alinma Bank of 
Saudi Arabia with a score of 0.05, DIB of UAE with 0.03, IIB of Qatar with 0.01, and 
ABC bank of Bahrain with zero. 
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Table 4.34: Results of ‘Shari’ah Governance’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.23 KFH 0.18 QIB 0.18 
AlRajh
i 0.09 DIB 0.03 
Al 
Barak
a 0.30 KIB 0.07 IIB 0.01 
AlJazir
a 0.07 ADI 0.09 
ABC 0.00 
Boubya
n 0.25 MR 0.10 Alinma 0.05 EIB 0.09 
Mean = 0.11 
The overall mean of the bank level results is only 0.11 for the CG dimension of the 
‘Shari’ah Governance’ index, indicating a very low level of disclosure. 
Table 4.35: Results of ‘Shari’ah Governance’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Shari’ah Governance 
Bahrain 0.181 
Kuwait 0.169 
Qatar 0.103 
Saudi Arabia 0.072 
UAE 0.072 
Mean = 0.11 
The results at the country level are depicted in table 4.35. This shows that Bahrain 
Islamic banks industry scored the highest mean discourse index with 0.181, followed 
by Kuwait with 0.169, Qatar with 0.103, and Saudi Arabia and UAE both with 0.072.  
4.4.7. Disclosure Results on ‘Shari’ah Compliance, Supports and Operations’ 
Dimension 
The results of the content analysis according for the CG Index’s ‘Shari’ah 
Compliance, Supports and Operations’ at the bank level are displayed in table 4.34, 
while those at the country level are shown in table 4.35.  
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Table 4.36: Results of ‘Shari’ah Compliance, Supports and Operations’ 
Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.00 KFH 0.00 QIB 0.00 
AlRajh
i 0.00 DIB 0.00 
Al 
Barak
a 0.00 KIB 0.00 IIB 0.00 
AlJazir
a 0.00 ADI 0.00 
ABC 0.00 
Boubya
n 0.00 MR 0.00 Alinma 0.00 EIB 0.00 
Mean = 0 
The results show that there is no disclosed information in the annual reports of the 
sampled banks and therefore the disclosure score is zero for each bank and country. 
Considering that this dimension is an essential aspect of CG for Islamic banks, the 
results are extremely disappointing.  
Table 4.37: Results of ‘Shari’ah Compliance, Supports and Operations’ 
Dimension at the Country Level 
Country 
Shari’ah Compliance, 
Supports and Operations 
Bahrain 0.00 
Kuwait 0.00 
Qatar 0.00 
Saudi Arabia 0.00 
UAE 0.00 
Mean = 0 
4.4.8. Disclosure Results on ‘Ethical Business Conduct and Corporate 
Responsibility’ Dimension 
Table 4.38 shows the results for the ‘ethical business conduct and corporate 
responsibility’ dimension of the CG ethical index at the bank level.  
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Table 4.38: Results of ‘Ethical Business Conduct and Corporate Responsibility’ 
Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.26 KFH 0.13 QIB 0.07 
AlRajh
i 0.07 DIB 0.04 
Al 
Barak
a 0.15 KIB 0.01 IIB 0.06 
AlJazir
a 0.06 ADI 0.07 
ABC 0.03 
Boubya
n 0.07 MR 0.09 Alinma 0.00 EIB 0.03 
Mean = 0.076 
The results show that Ithmar bank of Bahrain scored the highest with 0.26, followed 
by Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain with 0.15, and KFH of Kuwait with 0.13. The other 
banks performed even worse, with DIB of UAE scoring 0.04, ABC Bank of Bahrain, 
and EIB Bank of UAE both scoring 0.03, KIB of Kuwait with 0.01, and Alinma Bank 
of Saudi Arabia with zero all doing particularly poorly. The overall mean of the CG 
Index’s ‘Ethical Business Conduct and Corporate Responsibility’ dimension is 0.076. 
This is again a very low score, which fails to provide any confidence in CG practices 
of the sampled Islamic banks. 
Table 4.39: Results of ‘Ethical Business Conduct and Corporate Responsibility’ 
Dimension at the Country Level 
Country 
Ethical Business Conduct and 
Corporate Responsibility 
Bahrain 0.148 
Kuwait 0.076 
Qatar 0.076 
Saudi Arabia 0.046 
UAE 0.051 
Mean = 0.076 
The results at the country level can be seen in Table 4.39. Bahrain banks scored the 
highest with a disclosure score of 0.148, followed by Kuwait and Qatar banks with 
0.076, UAE banks with 0.051, and Saudi Arabian banks with 0.046.  
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4.4.9. Results of ‘Audit Committee’ Dimension 
The bank level results for the ‘audit committee’ under the CG ethical index are 
presented in Table 4.40. 
Table 4.40: Results of ‘Audit Committee’ Dimension at the Bank Level 
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x Bank 
Inde
x 
Ithma
r 0.29 KFH 0.14 QIB 0.10 
AlRajh
i 0.09 DIB 0.03 
Al 
Barak
a 0.20 KIB 0.05 IIB 0.01 
AlJazir
a 0.07 ADI 0.09 
ABC 0.08 
Boubya
n 0.08 MR 0.15 Alinma 0.05 EIB 0.09 
Mean = 0.10 
As can be seen from the results, Ithmar Bank of Bahrain scored the highest with 0.29, 
followed by Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain with 0.20, MR Bank of Qatar with 0.15 and 
KFH Bank of Kuwait with 0.14, The weakest performing banks were AlJazira Bank 
of Saudi Arabia with 0.07, KIB of Kuwait and Alinma Bank of Saudi Arabia both 
with 0.05, DIB of UAE with 0.03, and IIB of Qatar with 0.01. The mean is 0.10, 
which again does not provide much confidence in terms of disclosure performance of 
the sampled Islamic banks. 
Table 4.41: Results of ‘Audit Committee’ Dimension at the Country Level 
Country Audit Committee 
Bahrain 0.190 
Kuwait 0.093 
Qatar 0.090 
Saudi Arabia 0.072 
UAE 0.072 
Mean = 0.10 
The results at the country level are depicted in table 4.41. As can be seen, Bahraini 
Islamic banks scored the highest with a disclosure score of 0.190, followed by Kuwait 
with 0.093, Qatari banks with 0.090, and Saudi Arabia and UAE banks both with 
0.072.  
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4.4.10. Overall Results for the CG Disclosure Performance 
This section presents the overall results by ranking the banks and countries by their 
overall scores. 
Table 4.42: Overall CG Disclosure Results at Bank Level  
Ranking Name of Bank Country of Origin 
 
Overall Score for 
CG Disclosure 
1 Al Baraka Bahrain 0.330 
2 Ithmar Bahrain 0.325 
3 QIB Qatar 0.265 
4 EIB UAE 0.265 
5 ADI UAE 0.255 
6 MR Qatar 0.221 
7 AlRajhi Saudi Arabia  0.190 
8 KFH Kuwait 0.172 
9 Boubyan Kuwait 0.163 
10 AlJazira Saudi Arabia 0.154 
11 Alinma Saudi Arabia 0.141 
12 ABC Bahrain 0.101 
13 IIB Qatar 0.100 
14 DIB UAE 0.082 
15 KIB Kuwait 0.070 
Table 4.42 presents the overall CG disclosure results at the bank level. It shows that 
Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain scored the highest with 0.330; it was followed by Ithmar 
Bank of Bahrain with a disclosure score of 0.325, QIB of Qatar and EIB of UAE both 
with 0.265. The poorest performing banks were IIB of Qatar with 0.100, DIB of the 
UAE with 0.082 and KIB of Kuwait with 0.070. The overall CG disclosure is too low 
to provide confidence and trust in the operations of GCC Islamic banks.  
Table 4.43: Country Level for all the Dimensions 
Country CG Disclosure 
Bahrain 0.254 
UAE  0.210 
Qatar 0.197 
Saudi Arabia 0.163 
Kuwait  0.137 
Mean= 0.19 
Table 4.43 provides the ranking of the countries for the overall CG disclosure, which 
shows that Bahrain is the best scoring country with score of 0.254, followed by UAE 
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with 0.210, Qatar with 0.197 and Saudi Arabia with 0.163, while Kuwait is the lowest 
scoring country with score of 0.137.  
Table 4.44: Dimension Level CG Disclosure Index Score Ranking 
Dimension CGDI Dimensions 
BM 0.640 
Mission 0.470 
NCCC 0.188 
Sh Gov 0.119 
CBD 0.106 
Audit Com 0.101 
EBCCR 0.076 
BL 0.000 
SCSO  0.000 
Mean=0.18 
Table 4.44 presents the CG disclosure index in terms of overall dimension scores. It 
shows that the most information among the CG dimensions is for ‘Board Meeting’ 
with 0.640, implying that 64% of the expected information is communicated. In 
contrast, ‘Shari’ah Compliance, Supports and Operations’ and ‘Board Leadership’ 
related information is zero, which is a source of considerable concern.  
4.4.11 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CSRDI AND THE CGDI 
As stated in the introduction, this study hypothesises that there is a positive 
correlation between CSRDI and CGDI in the sense that CG practices determine and 
provide the necessary environment for CSR practices. This section aims to establish if 
there is any correlation between CSRDI and CGDI. In searching for any correlation, 
parametric and non-parametric correlation measures are used to test the relationship.  
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Table 4.45: Pearson Correlation between CSRDI and CGDI 
 CSRDI CGDI 
CSRDI Pearson Correlation 1 .578* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .024 
N 15 15 
CGDI Pearson Correlation .578* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .024  
N 15 15 
Note: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The parametric test, the Pearson Correlation test, is used and the results are depicted 
in Table 4.45. The results indicate a positive and statistically significant result at the 
5% level of significance. However, the strength of the relationship remains medium; 
as the Pearson Correlation produced a score of 0.578 (note that perfect correlation 
should be close to ±1). The results implies that the CG and CSR practices move in the 
same direction, indicating that any betterment of CGDI will lead to better CSRDI 
practices. 
In order to respond to the possibility that the data used in this study might be non-
parametric due to the nature of the data, non-parametric correlation analysis in the 
form of Spearman’s Rho was utilized. The results can be seen in Table 4.46. These 
show that there is a statistically significant and positive correlation between CSRDI 
and CGDI at the 5% level of significance. The results indicate that strength of the 
correlation (0.629) is above medium, but still moderate. This implies that CGDI and 
CSRDI move together in the same direction; betterment in one will lead to betterment 
in the other. Thus, the initial assumption made by this study is proved by the 
correlation results. 
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Table 4.46: Spearman’s Rho between CSRDI and CGDI 
 CSRDI CGDI 
Spearman's rho CSRDI Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .629* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .012 
N 15 15 
CGDI Correlation Coefficient .629* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 . 
N 15 15 
Note: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation analysis is useful in informing about the relationship between two 
variables, in this case CSRDI and CGDI. However, it does not inform us of the 
direction of the relationship. This research, as identified in the aims and objectives, 
assumes that CG should be the one to define the framework for CSR and hence the 
causality should run from CGDI to CSRDI. However, causality analysis could not be 
undertaken in this study. 
4.5. CORRELATING LONGEVITY AND CSRDI AND CGDI SCORES 
This section provides further understanding on the CSRDI and CGDI scores of the 
sampled Islamic banks by correlating the age of the sampled banks with their CSR 
and CG scores. Two hypotheses are investigated: 
1) older banks should have better structures, processes, procedures and 
philosophy for conducting CSR and structuring their CG 
2) older banks have not been exposed to such matters and therefore younger 
banks have adopted a more efficient way of approaching such matters. 
The ages of the sampled banks were collected from their annual reports and the data 
were correlated with the CSR and CG scores previously established. Table 4.47 
depicts the age of banks and CSR and GC scores. 
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Table 4.47: Descriptive Statistics for Correlation Analysis between Age of Banks 
and CSR and CG Scores 
Name of the Bank Age of the Bank CSR Scores CG Scores 
Ithmar  11 years (2003 - 2014) 0.420 0.325 
QIB 32 years (1982 – 2014) 0.338 0.265 
EIB 39 years (1975 – 2014) 0.368 0.265 
ADI 18 years (1997 – 2014) 0.438 0.255 
MR   7 years (2006 – 2014) 0.285 0.221 
KFH 37 years (1977 – 2014) 0.268 0.172 
Boubyan 10 years (2004 – 2014) 0.183 0.163 
Aljazira 39 years (1975 – 2014) 0.263 0.154 
Alinma   6 years (2008 – 2014) 0.186 0.141 
ABC 30 years (1984 – 2014) 0.207 0.101 
DIB 35 years (1975 – 2014) 0.132 0.082 
Al Baraka 12 years (2002 – 2014) 0.435 0.330 
AlRajhi 57 years (1957 – 2014) 0.260 0.190 
IIB 13 years (1991 – 2014) 0.168 0.100 
KIB 33 years (1973 – 2014) 0.075 0.070 
As can be seen from the non-parametric correlation analysis results highlighted in 
table 4.46, the correlation analysis produced – 0.093 in the case of ‘age of banks’ and 
‘CSR Score’, which implies that there is a negative relationship between them; and 
the correlation coefficient is only 9.3%. The statistical result shows that there is no 
statistical significance in the case of correlation between the two as the Chi-Square 
result is 0.741, which is higher than the tabular value of 0.05. 
The correlation coefficient between ‘age of the banks’ and ‘the CG score’ is -0.145, 
implying that there is a negative correlation between the ‘age of banks’ and ‘the CG 
score’; however, the strength of the relationship is very low, less than 15%, and it is 
not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.48: Correlation Analysis Results for the Relationship between Age of 
Banks and CSR and CG Disclosure 
 Age of the 
Banks 
CSR 
Disclosure 
Score 
CG 
Disclosure 
Score 
Spearman's rho Age of the 
Banks 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 -.093 -.145 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .741 .605 
N 15 15 15 
CSR Disclosure 
Score 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.093 1.000 .924** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .741 . .000 
N 15 15 15 
CG Disclosure 
Score 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.145 .924** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .605 .000 . 
N 15 15 15 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
As the analysis shows, it seems that older banks do not necessarily have the best 
practices in CSR disclosure and CG disclosure, as the correlation analysis implies that 
younger banks have better disclosure practices in both aspects. This can be explained 
by the fact that younger banks may have better opportunities to be exposed and to 
adopt disclosure practices in CSR and CG; and their organizational structure is 
perhaps more open to such practices which are considered ‘new’ and ‘modern’. The 
results imply that the traditional organizational structures of older banks are not 
necessarily ready to accept new forms of doing business. 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents and analyses the results of the CSR and CG disclosure index 
performance for the sampled Islamic banks measured through the results obtained 
from the content analysis. It then examines the correlation between CSR and GC and 
explains the practices of the sampled Islamic banks are parallel in terms of CSR and 
CG disclosures.   
The findings reveal Al Baraka Bank of Bahrain achieved the highest score in terms of 
the overall CG disclosure followed by Ithmar bank of Bahrain with 0.325, and QIB of 
Qatar with 0.265, while the lowest score was by KIB of Kuwait with 0.070. 
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Furthermore, the overall CG disclosure is rather low thereby undermining confidence 
and trust in the operations of GCC Islamic banks. An attempt is also made to find the 
most reported CSR dimension, which is ‘mission and vision’ with 0.47, implying that 
47% of the expected information is communicated. In contrast, the ‘research and 
development’ dimension disclosure is minimal at only 2.8% of the expected 
information disclosed.  
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Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1. SUMMARIZING THE FINDINGS  
The previous chapter presents an in-depth analysis based on the exploration of the 
secondary data through the developed ethicality index; for which the data was subject 
to content analysis in an attempt to measure the CG and CSR disclosure performance 
of the GCC Islamic banks. In doing so, the relationship between CG and CSR 
disclosure performance as measured through the individual indices was investigated. 
This chapter concludes by summarising the results and providing reflections on the 
results.  
As is illustrated in the literature review and the analysis chapters, the ultimate goal of 
the Islamic moral economy is to establish a balanced society, which includes justice 
and fairness in the socio-economic welfare of its citizens alongside a legitimate 
understanding of wealth generation. Thus, all the institutions in the Islamic economy, 
financial and non-financial sectors, are expected to work towards this moral 
responsibility, which is summed up by maqasid al-shari’ah, (the objectives of 
shari’ah), which are interpreted as human well-being. As Islamic banks and financial 
institutions are the only institutional forms of the Islamic economy at the present time, 
they are expected to live by these higher objectives. In this context, this study 
evaluates the performance of the sampled Islamic banks from the GCC in relation to 
CG and CSR in relation to respective indices created through the articulation of 
Islamic moral economy expectations. 
In line with the high rates of growth of the Islamic finance industry, particularly in the 
GCC, it is important to examine the performance of Islamic banks in relation to CSR 
and CG. Since both CSR and CG place greater emphasis on the ethical side of the 
business practices it is also necessary to reflect on these ideas can result in an 
improved performance of the financial institutions in order to produce a better 
outcome for their shareholders. 
The sample was based on the main Islamic banks in the GCC; a total of 15 banks, 
with three from each country Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. The 
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selection criterion was based on the asset size of the major Islamic banks. After the 
sampling, their annual reports were collected for 5 years from 2008 to 2012. Thus, 75 
annual reports were sampled for content analysis. In conducting the coding method to 
examine the annual reports with the objective of identifying the communicated 
information, individual indices were developed for CSR and CG disclosures. The 
dimensions and elements of the indices can be found in Table 3.1, and are described 
in detail in the research methodology chapter. 
In order to use the annual reports to measure the CSR and CG performance, ten 
dimensions were created for the CSR disclosure index and nine dimensions were 
formed for the CG disclosure index. The sub-constituents or elements of these 
dimensions were drawn from the principles and norms of the Islamic moral economy 
as well as from the international Islamic finance standards.  
In responding to the research aims and questions, this study hypothesises that Islamic 
banks and financial institutions should be placed in high score areas in relation to CG 
and CSR disclosure performance. Second, the study also hypothesises that there is a 
positive correlation between CSR and good CG practices in Islamic banks, which are 
considered as essential elements of Islamic moral economy and finance. In other 
words, it is assumed that an efficient and effective CG structure and environment 
should lead to a better CSR score, as these institutions must perform well in these 
areas because Islamic bank operations, forms and institutionalisation are expected to 
reflect the higher objectives. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings, the results and the measurements of CSR and CG 
performance of the sampled Islamic banks from the GCC region derived from their 
annual reports. As the results indicate, the CG and CSR disclosure performances of 
the banks do not meet the expectations with the scores being rather low. Second, there 
is no significant correlation between CSR and CG disclosure performance scores as 
measured by the indices used. Contradicts the above sentence?   
As highlighted in Chapter 4, during the period in question, in terms of the bank and 
country level performance, the most communicated information in the annual reports 
among the CSR dimensions is related to ‘Mission and Vision’ with an index score of 
0.47, implying that 47% of the expected information for this dimension is 
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communicated. It should be noted that the lowest performing dimension is found to be 
‘Research and Development’ (R&D), as only 2.8% of the expected information is 
disclosed in the case of R&D in the sample.  
Table 4.22 presents the overall bank level results for the CSR disclosure of the main 
Islamic banks in the GCC region. The bank with the highest score was ADI Bank 
from the UAE with a score of 0.438 of the CSR practices. The lowest performance on 
CSR disclosure and practices was KIB of Kuwait, which scored an overall 0.075. 
As regards country level, Kuwaiti Islamic banks scored the lowest on the CSR 
disclosure index among the sampled GCC countries with a mean score of 0.175%. 
Similarly, in terms of CG disclosure index performance, Kuwait scored the lowest at 
0.137%, with zeroes in the three dimensions of ‘Ethical Business Conduct and 
Corporate Responsibility’, ‘Board Leadership and Shari’ah Compliance’ and 
‘Supports and Operations’.   
At the bank level of the CG disclosure performance, the most communicated 
information among the CG dimensions is for ‘Board Meeting’ with an index score of 
0.64, implying that 64% of the expected information on ‘Board Meeting’ is 
communicated through the examined annual reports. However, ‘Shari’ah 
Compliance, Supports and Operations’ related disclosure information could not be 
located in any of the annual reports, and therefore zero score is achieved in this 
particular dimension.  
Table 4.1 presents the overall results on the bank level for CG and shows that Ithmar 
Bank of Bahrain scored the highest with a disclosure score of 0.325, followed by QIB 
of Qatar with a score of 0.265, and EIB of UAE which scored 0.265. The lowest score 
was by KIB of Kuwait with 0.07.  
Overall, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were found to be the lowest performers in terms of 
the CSR and CG disclosure performance indices, while Bahrain, UAE and Qatar 
scored the highest scores for CSR and CG disclosure practices.  
Despite the low scores achieved in the CG and CSR disclosure indices, the research 
attempted to establish if there was a positive correlation between the two sets of 
84	  	  
results. However, there is no correlation for the Islamic banks between their social 
and financial performance.  
Overall, the results indicate that Islamic banks failed to disclose information for most 
of their CSR and CG related dimensions, while it was observed that most of the 
information disclosed relates to financial information about their bank performance. It 
should be noted that only a few banks were able to disclose valuable information in 
relation to their CSR and CG expectations. 
5.2. CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RESULTS 
While the CG and CSR disclosure index scores for the sampled GCC Islamic banks 
are found to be low, there could be a number of issues affecting the results. For 
example, the political economies of the GCC countries do not necessarily prioritize 
CG issues; CG codes in these countries are not well established. Therefore, the banks, 
whether Islamic or not, do not have the necessary motivation to disclose information, 
which will be detrimental for empirical studies such as this one. 
In addition, disclosure can have certain implications in the case of Muslim culture, in 
particular in relation to CSR practices. According to Islamic principles, ‘giving’ such 
as ‘sadaqah’ (doing a good deed) or contributing towards the wellbeing of society, 
should not be highlighted by the individuals concerned, as it is considered more pious 
not to do so. This perhaps can be considered as a cultural reason why CSR and CG 
practices disclosed by the sampled GCC Islamic banks are very low. However, given 
that Islamic banks are legal entities and not individuals, the piety-oriented Islamic 
principle should not apply. In the context, AAOIFI governance standards state it is 
essential that CSR and CG related issues should be disclosed by Islamic banks. 
However, among the sampled countries, only Bahrain imposed AAOIFI standards on 
its own Islamic banks, with a high score of 0.364.  
It is argued that since the shari’ah responsibility is integrated in the financial 
performance of Islamic banks and other financial institutions, CSR should be fulfilled 
by definition. However, as the operation of Islamic banks highlights, the process of 
the shari’ah is very much relegated to legal responsibility in terms of fulfilling the 
form. Given that the Islamic definition of shari’ah historically implies ethical along 
with legal responsibility, the substance of the law should also be prioritized. As 
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discussed in the earlier chapters, CSR and CG practices are legitimatized and 
rationalized through Islamic norms driven by the Islamic moral economy. Therefore 
Islamic banks are expected to follow such norms and establish a balance between the 
form and the substance of shari’ah.  
As a practical reflection, it should be noted that the sample size in this study is limited 
to only 15 banks in the GCC. Therefore, caution should be taken in interpreting the 
results. 
5.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
In order to overcome the sampling issues, future research may consider a much larger 
sample to develop the findings, which can then be generalized more accurately. In 
addition, the data set could be enlarged by increasing the period under consideration. 
In addition, further econometrics techniques could perhaps be employed to measure, 
for example, causality between CG and CSR. Finally, the correlation analysis could 
be extended by conducting an econometric study to define the micro and macro 
determinants of the observed scores.  
Furthermore, since the content of the indices are constructed, the data set can be 
expanded with further banks with longer period of coverage. In addition, financial 
performances of the sampled banks can also be conducted. Consequently, an 
econometric analysis can be conducted between CSRD, CGD and financial 
performance to locate the causal impact as to whether CSRD and CGD performance 
causing financial performance or otherwise.  
 
As a future research, this research can be expanded through social performance 
analysis through maqasid al-Shari’ah, which is defined as ‘human well-being’. Since 
maqasid al-Shari’ah is the articulation of CSR and CG performances, measuring 
maqasid dimension through Ghazalian as well as extended maqasid al-Shari’ah 
through Shatibi and Ibn Qayyim will provide an opportunity to create similar indices 
as this study did. Thus, by conducting content analysis maqasid al-Shari’ah 
disclousures can be located in relation to social performance. This will provide a more 
authentic understanding of measuring social performance of Islamic banks and 
financial institutions, as maqasid al-Shari’ah dimensions are the articulation of 
Islamic moral economy expectations. In addition, this research can be expanded 
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further to examine a potential impact of CSR and CG disclosure on financial 
performance through conducting regression analysis.  
5.4. LIMITATIONS AND DIFFICULTIES 
It is vital to understand that this research was subject to various limitations such as the 
difficulties faced in collecting data given that few Islamic banks are long-established 
and therefore data is by necessity limited. For example, data for the International 
Islamic Bank, Masraf Al-Rayan of Qatar and Alinma bank of Saudi Arabia were not 
available for the year 2008. The limited data is an obstacle in conducting the research, 
and undermining the accuracy of analysis. Furthermore, since the research focused 
mainly on Islamic Banks within the GGC further research extend to geographical 
reach to the Middle East and North Africa region and possibly beyond. Moreover, a 
comparative analysis with other countries and regions would add value to the results; 
for example comparing Malaysia with Qatar or Kuwait, could be a fruitful area of 
study. 
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